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Abstract: The big data revolution, like many changes 
associated with technological advancement, is often 
compared to the industrial revolution to create a frame of 
reference for its transformative power, or portrayed as 
altogether new. This article argues that between the 
industrial revolution and the digital revolution is a more 
valuable, yet overlooked period: the probabilistic revolution 
that began with the avalanche of printed numbers between 
1820 and 1840. By comparing the many similarities between 
big data today and the avalanche of numbers in the 1800s, 
the article situates big data in the early stages of a prolonged 
transition to a potentially transformative epistemic 
revolution, like the probabilistic revolution. The widespread 
changes in and characteristics of a society flooded by data 
results in a transitional state that creates unique challenges 
for policy efforts by disrupting foundational principles relied 
upon for data protection. The potential of a widespread, 
lengthy transition also places the law in a pivotal position to 
shape and guide big data-based inquiry through to whatever 
epistemic shift may lie ahead. 
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Paris Vaudeville, March 16, 1861: 
 
Magis: Statistics, Madame, is a modern and positive science. It sheds 
light on even the most obscure facts. Thus recently, thanks to 
laborious research, we now know the exact number of widows that 
crossed the Pont Neuf during 1860. 
 
Horace, rising: Bah. 
 
Desambois: This is prodigious. And how many? 
 
Magis: Thirteen thousand, four hundred and ninety eight, plus one 
doubtful case.1 
 
Twitter, @BigDataBorat, January 1, 2014: 
 
#BigData2014Predictions #1: Falling #bigdata hype force 3 Vs model 
to be reduced to 2 Vs model. "Variety" temporary loan to 3-D 
Printing.2 
INTRODUCTION 
In the spirit of big data, this article is a prediction based on data 
collected from the past. The data comes from a twenty-year period in 
the mid-1800s, and the prediction is that data protection has a long, 
challenging road ahead. Big data is often referred to as a revolution 
and the article asks and provides insight into just how revolutionary 
big data may be – and what that means for data protection.  
The industrial revolution is the revolution of choice for 
understanding the transformative nature of the big data revolution.3 
Articles detailing the story of big data begin just after World War II 
 
 
 
 
1 Ian Hacking, Nineteenth Century Cracks in the Concept of Determinism, 44:3 J.  HIST. 
IDEAS 455, 473 (1983). 
2 Big Data Borat, Twitter, (Jan. 1, 2014), https://twitter.com/BigDataBorat/ 
status/418473520100683776. 
3 See e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION 
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 182 (2013); Neil Richards & 
Jonathan King, Big Data Ethics, WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming, 2014). 
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with the birth of modern computing.4 The end of the story generally 
tells us of an impending big data revolution that will change the world 
and that the law must figure out how to weigh the pros and cons of big 
data practices.5  
But, just after the industrial revolution came a revolution that has 
been overlooked and perhaps is more pertinent: the probabilistic 
revolution launched by the avalanche of printed numbers that flooded 
Europe between 1820 and 1840. By focusing solely on the 
technological transformations at the beginning of each period, an 
informative epistemic and ethical transformation that occurred 
between the industrial revolution and the digital revolution has gone 
unnoticed. Looking at big data through this lens allows us to assess it 
as an epistemic revolution, as opposed to simply a technological or 
economic revolution. Comparing the flood of data that washed over 
society after a technical revolution two hundred years ago to the flood 
of data we are experiencing today after the computer revolution offers 
insight into our attempts to govern it. 
Taking a closer look at the avalanche of numbers (what I will call 
first wave big data) reveals remarkable similarities to the second wave 
of big data occurring today. Between 1820 and 1840, a flood of data 
from across society became available, aggregated, analyzed, and acted 
upon. From this period, a series of similarities to big data can be 
extracted: datafication issues, big data lures, and structural changes. A 
number of social issues surfaced in the 1800s that have resurfaced 
today: governability, classification effects, and data-based knowledge.6 
Enthusiasm for big data during both periods was driven by particular 
lures: standardized sharing, objectivity, control through feedback, 
enumeration, and the discovery versus production of knowledge.7 
Both periods also experience(d) structural changes: division of data 
labor, methodological changes, and a displacement of theory.8  
 
 
 
 
4 See e.g., Richards & King, supra note 3. 
5 See e.g., Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data Making Ends Meet 66 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2013); Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Big Data for All: Privacy 
and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11:5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239 (2013); 
Cukier & Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 3, at 172-183. 
6 Infra Section III (B). 
7 Infra Section III (A). 
8 Infra Section III (C). 
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With these similarities established, it appears that big data 
represents another influx of data following the development of 
momentous technological power and may serve as the springboard for 
significant epistemic transformation. Thus, big data is not the 
revolution - big data is the avalanche of numbers, which was 
intimately intertwined with the probabilistic revolution. Any 
proceeding revolution could certainly be more rapid or more sluggish 
than the course taken by the probabilistic revolution - or may never 
come to fruition. Because big data’s revolutionary status is in question 
in the article, I will discontinue using the term ‘big data revolution’ to 
avoid confusion and reserve the term revolution for either technical 
revolutions (industrial or computer) or an epistemic revolution 
(probabilistic). Instead, I will refer to a ‘big data transition.’ To get a 
better understanding of the nature of any big data transition 
underway - and what that means for data protection - requires 
another comparative exercise: comparing the probabilistic revolution 
to other scientific revolutions. 
First, the structure of a scientific revolution, outlined by Thomas 
Kuhn,9 and related concepts are discussed. Then, relying on the 
similarities extracted in the earlier section, a comparison is made 
between the probabilistic revolution as a scientific revolution and the 
big data transition as a scientific revolution. Both are more accurately 
described as emergent, rather than revolutionary.10 The challenging 
characteristics of scientific revolutions - namely value disputes, 
multiple perspectives, theoretical quarrels, and methodological 
changes11 that eventually settle into a new view of the world – are 
 
 
 
 
9 THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
10 Infra Section IV. 
11 Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Revetz coined the term Post-Normal Science in the 1980s to 
describe new approaches to “wicked problems,” characterized by uncertain facts, disputed 
values, high stakes, and urgent political decisions. Silvio Funtowicz & Jerome Revetz, 
Three Types of Risk Assessment and the Emergence of Post-Normal Science, in SOCIAL 
THEORIES OF RISK 251–274, 253 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding, eds., 1992). These 
are post-normal problems for post-normal science as opposed to normal problems 
presented by normal science. The means to developing sound scientific answers to wicked 
problems are an extended peer community, a new quality-oriented reference system, and 
the consideration of extended facts. This concept is utilized almost exclusively by those 
working in environmental and ecological issues. The term “post-normal” is intended to 
address the period of transition between normal sciences. For a discussion on the various 
ways “post-normal science” has been used and expanded upon see John Turnpenny, Mavis 
Jones, & Irene Lorenzoni, Where Now for Post-Normal Science: A Critical Review of its 
Development, Definitions, and Uses, 36:3 SCI., TECH., & HUMAN VALUES 287-306 (2011). 
2015] AMBROSE 205 
 
present in these emergences, which differ from revolutions because 
they develop across society over a long period of time.  
Data protection in this type of transition is incredibly difficult. 
Foundational data protection regimes, like the Fair Information 
Practices Principles (FIPPs), have already begun to feel the strain of 
this transition. This is because FIPPs protects values and resolved 
datafication issues by prescribing a process that no longer fits 
attempts to understand the world, which are presented in various 
forms from various directions and have yet to find consensus. The law 
takes on a role of legitimizing practices as they progress without a 
crystal ball to know what, if any, epistemic revolution lies ahead. In 
addition to this role, the law may also mitigate the growing pains of 
this shift by revisiting the datafication issues and lures of big data in 
light of the second wave of big data changes with the lessons from the 
first wave of big data in hand.   
The article makes three specific contributions and proceeds in five 
parts. The first contribution is methodological, offering an approach 
to new socio-technical issues that situates the subject in historical 
context to assess larger social, ethical, and legal implications. By 
locating and comparing big data to the avalanche of numbers, I offer a 
new perspective of the technological practice that has proven difficult 
to pin down. The second is categorical, providing a set of similarities 
between big data and the avalanche of numbers and then categorizing 
both as a pre-epistemic emergence, as compared to a scientific 
revolution. By providing this type of categorization we may 
distinguish governance approaches for scientific and technological 
revolutions, emerging technologies, emerging uses, and emergences, 
to name only a few potential labels. The third is substantive, 
suggesting a cyclical relationship between technological innovation, 
an outpour of data, and epistemic shifts as well as extracting the 
associated legal and ethical questions.  
Section I further outlines the methodology developed to better 
situate big data in historical context. Section II describes big data and 
the avalanche of numbers. Section III categorizes their relevant 
transitional similarities. Section IV compares these transitions to 
other scientific revolutions. Section V discusses the challenging and 
opportune role of law and lessons that can be learned from the 
avalanche of numbers and the probabilistic revolution. 
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I. METHOD 
“History does not repeat, but it does rhyme.” – Mark Twain12 
 
As socio-technical legal researchers tackling cyberlaw and 
emerging technology issues across a range of legal contexts, we 
regularly begin with a socio-technical problem. A new technology or a 
new social use or unexpected consequence triggers some kind of 
interesting legal problem that provokes an argument or research 
question. This functional approach begins by de-black boxing the 
technology or practice and then describes the social issues using 
hypotheticals, social science research, or some other evidence that 
convinces the reader that the problem should raise eyebrows. Next the 
shortcomings of existing law are outlined followed by a normative 
proposal, assessing and disregarding those that are legally, 
technically, or practically unacceptable. The proposals for emerging 
socio-technical legal issues are often combinations of Lawrence 
Lessig’s four forms of governance (norms, markets, code, and law). 
Much socio-technical legal research has followed this path to analyze 
and provide solutions for social and ethical issues arising from big 
data practices.13 This article attempts to enrich the beginning and 
inform the end of these pursuits. Big data is not a technology but is 
 
 
 
 
12 The attribution to Twain has been around since the 1970s but no evidence that he spoke 
or wrote the words has been revealed. See JAMES GEORGE EAYRS, DIPLOMACY AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS 121 (1971) (“(When Mark Twain declared ‘History does not repeat itself, but 
it rhymes,’ he went about as far as he could go) Even the closest historical parallels are only 
analogues; they are never identical.”). 
13 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due 
Process, 85 WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer 
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001); Paul M. 
Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of 
Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011); Jane R. Bambauer, 
Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. (2011); Ryan Calo, Digital 
Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Omer Tene and Jules 
Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J.  
TECH. & INT. PROP. 239 (2013); Ira Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New 
Beginning, 3:2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 74 (2013); Julie Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); Lior Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 2010 (2013); Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 55 (2013); Woodrow Hartzog and Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 
66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 81 (2013); Neil M. Richards, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 41 (2013); Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, supra note 3; Richards 
and King, supra note 3; Julia Lane, Victoria Stodden, Stefan Bender, and Helen 
Nissenbaum (eds.), PRIVACY BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (2014). 
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necessarily technological. It is not an unintended use or consequence 
of a technology but is a use of technology and may have unintended 
consequences. In an attempt to better understand big data and its 
social implications, the article analyzes the socio-technical 
phenomenon by looking to the past for clarity on how to proceed with 
governance.  
Although “those that cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it,”14 Richard Neustadt and Ernest May argue that history can 
misinform as well as inform policy-makers.15 The authors, while 
teaching Decision Making at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, developed methods for policy-makers to utilize history 
effectively. While their text Think in Time is not necessarily intended 
to be a scholarly methodology, the exercises are nonetheless utilized in 
this text. For instance, the authors suggest asking “What’s the story?” 
as opposed to “What’s the problem?” and draft a timeline to 
understand sequences or causation. It also only attempts to reframe 
some of the issues and ask better questions, as opposed to suggesting 
specific action based on what should have or could have been done in 
the past. The comparative exercise is not intended to suggest that big 
data and the avalanche of numbers are the same, but that big data is 
new in a way that is similar to the way the avalanche of numbers was 
new. But, what type of newness are we dealing with? This is a vital 
question for a field investigating the governance of emerging socio-
technical issues. We must assess and predict the nature of 
technological innovation and integration to choose what we spend 
time on, determine how those subjects are framed, and craft viable 
and sustainable governance solutions. 
Of course, the article is not intended to be a prediction in any real 
sense, but a way of situating the data protection policy debate to view 
the work being undertaken from the forest instead of through the 
trees. Time periods, innovations, and phenomena are reflected upon 
by historians who have established markers of what signifies a 
scientific revolution. Although it would be uncouth for a historian to 
predict whether a scientific revolution is approaching, legal and 
technology scholars have no choice but to make predictions about 
emerging technologies and social change16 and so, I will perform the 
 
 
 
 
14 George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, in THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905). 
15 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT AND ERNEST R. MAY, THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF HISTORY FOR 
DECISION-MAKERS (1986). 
16 So often we are combatting the complaint that the law cannot keep up with technological 
change. See e.g., Vivek Wadwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT 
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exercise. My approach is historical and comparative and loosely 
resembles comparative-historical research, which is rarely attempted 
in anything shorter than a book-length analysis and seeks to answer 
incredibly large-scale questions, like what factors shaped the 
development of state-regimes in Western Christendom during the 
eighteenth century.17  
This article departs from the comparative-historical analysis in 
numerous ways. The first difference is the purpose of the analysis. 
Historical-comparative research seeks to “ask questions and formulate 
puzzles about specific sets of cases that exhibit sufficient similarity to 
be meaningfully compared with one another.”18 While historical-
comparative research does not seek to create general knowledge, and 
neither does this article, the field does seek to establish causal 
configurations by comparing similarities and divergences during 
clearly delineated historical periods.19 The specific perspective taken 
to view the historical cases here is similar but intended to inform 
policy approaches to emerging technology and associated social 
changes – namely, big data and associated epistemic and ethical 
issues.  
The analysis is streamlined based on this precisely focused goal. 
This article takes a single case20 (the avalanche of numbers which 
                                                                                                                   
TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2014), available at http://www.technologyreview.com/ view/ 
526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pace-with-technology/. 
17 THOMAS ERTMAN, BIRTH OF THE LEVIATHAN: BUILDING STATES AND REGIMES IN MEDIEVAL 
AND EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1997). Parallels outside social scientists actively pursuing 
historical-comparative methodologies, Tim Wu’s Master Switch is comparative historical 
work that loosely resembles this method as well. He identifies a communication innovation 
cycle (moving from the openness of tinkering in basements and sharing freely to 
centralized closed systems, which launches another cycle) and in doing so places the 
newness of the internet in context with prior novel technologies’ newness. “Illuminating 
the past to anticipate the future is the raison d'être of this book.” TIM WU, THE MASTER 
SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 7 (2010). Tom Standage’s The 
Victorian Internet does not identify a cycle but does look back to draw important 
comparisons between the newness of the telegraph and the newness of the internet. TOM 
STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY’S ON-LINE PIONEERS (2014). Perhaps a book is the only way to 
perform these types of research endeavors in a satisfactory way, in which case, I consider 
this article a jumping off point for such a project.  
18 James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparative Historical Analysis, in 
COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 8 (James Mahoney and 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., 2003). 
19 Id. 
20 Looking at a single case can actually have its own benefits. The single time period 
focused on in this article is made up of numerous cases – a number of countries 
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occurred across Europe between 1820 and 1840), relying entirely on 
secondary sources21 from renowned experts in the field of the history 
of statistics, and compares it to an ongoing phenomenon (big data). 
And so, I refer to my comparative conclusions as predictions instead 
of explanations. 
The basic tenets of comparative-historical research (causal 
analysis, processes over time, and systematic and contextualized 
comparison22) are observed but also manipulated. While I suggest a 
causal relationship in the process of technological change, a wave of 
data, and epistemic revolution and draw contextualized comparisons, 
there are two important caveats. The first is that the wave of data both 
causes and is caused by the epistemic revolution. A linear causal 
relationship is not supported by the research. The second is that the 
goal of the analysis is not to prove such a cycle exists, but to better 
contextualize and inform the role of law in periods of socio-technical 
change. To meet that goal, I compare the most related historical 
process of socio-technical change to one at issue today. The 
probabilistic revolution (1800-1930) blossomed out of and drove the 
avalanche of numbers (1820-1840) that followed the industrial 
revolution (1760-1820); big data has followed the computer revolution 
with similar pacing. This comparison commences first by sketching 
out the two periods and then by extracting and organizing relevant 
changes and characteristics shared by the two periods.  
                                                                                                                   
experienced the avalanche of numbers and shaped and were shaped by probabilistic 
thinking. While I reference the two countries with the most useful similarities (and avoid 
France, as a country with a government stronghold on statistical practices during the time, 
and the U.S., as an early adopter of the census but a late adopter of probability). While an 
older wave of big data would certainly be interesting to include, it would be difficult to 
compare such a case to today. Nonetheless, I continue to search for such a relevant case to 
incorporate. “[T]he study of single historical cases can do much more than merely generate 
initial hypotheses. It not only can develop new theoretical ideas, but it can also put them to 
the test and use the results in the explanation of outcomes. Moving beyond the first case 
yields often particularly powerful new insights. At the same time, cross-case variation 
presents difficult methodological problems for macrosocial analysis, both quantitative and 
qualitative… [T]estable and tested explanatory propositions are not the only gains we can 
derive from the analysis of a limited number of cases.” Id., at 307. 
21 It is common to use a mix of sources in comparative historical analysis, but the research 
often relies heavily on secondary historical and social sources. Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 
supra note 18, at 3-24; Edwin Amenta, What We Know about the Development of Social 
Policy, in COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 91-123 (James 
Mahoney and Deitrich Rueschemeyer, eds., 2006). Those scholars working on emerging 
technology will likely find this deference most appropriate. 
22 MAHONEY & RUESCHEMEYER, supra note 18 at 8. 
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From the historical comparison, further contextual comparison is 
performed. The epistemic revolution that followed the avalanche of 
numbers and may follow big data is compared with other scientific 
revolutions to better understand the role of policy in any potential 
revolutionary developments. Relying on the criteria laid out by Kuhn 
and on the assessment by Ian Hacking of the probabilistic revolution, 
big data is situated similarly to the avalanche of numbers as the early 
stages in an emergent type of transition, with its own characteristics 
relevant to policy keeping up with technological change. It is 
important to note that this is not a legal-historical comparison. 
Although such a comparison would be incredibly valuable, the role of 
law during the probabilistic revolution has not been the focus of any 
legal historians and so, beyond the scope of this article. 
After pulling back (twice) to attain this view of big data and the 
role of law in such a possibly long, likely uncertain transition, the final 
section poses a number of questions based on the societal challenges 
faced during the probabilistic revolution that may be pursued without 
a clear grasp of the benefits and harms of big data.  
II. DATA, DATAFICATION & BIG DATA 
In this section I offer a definition of “data” as a representation that 
is mediated through social practices and discuss the phenomenon of 
“datafication.” Then the two waves of big data are described, followed 
by a section devoted to unpacking their similarities. 
A. Data and Datafication 
Data is defined as “a representation of facts or ideas in a 
formalized manner capable of being communicated or manipulated by 
some process.”23 This definition of data is fairly modern. It evolved 
with changes in philosophical theories of knowledge (epistemology) 
and with developments in the science of statistics. The term “data” 
was used in the early 17th century to refer to irrefutable or self-evident 
truths that were beyond the realm of empirical verification.24 Today 
the term data continues to carry an air of irrefutability. But rather 
than refer to axioms, data are now understood to be representations of 
 
 
 
 
23 Ian H. Gould, I.F.I.P. Guide to Concepts and Terms in Data Processing, INT’L 
FEDERATION OF INFO. PROCESSING (1971). 
24 Daniel Rosenberg, Data Before the Fact, in RAW DATA IS AN OXYMORON 19 (Lisa 
Gitelman ed.,2013). 
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small pieces of information observed, sensed, and collected in daily 
life. The acceptance of data is (and was) the product of surrounding 
culture and mediated through layers of context, language, and tools.  
To mediate an object, a digital or computational device 
requires that this object be translated into the digital 
code that it can understand… [A] computer requires 
that everything is transformed from the continuous 
flow of our everyday reality into a grid of numbers that 
can be stored as a representation of reality which can 
then be manipulated by algorithms.25   
According to this definition, data must be communicated or 
manipulated by a process. According to this definition there is no raw 
data. “Raw data is both an oxymoron and a bad idea; to the contrary, 
data should be cooked with care.”26 Perhaps not with care, data is 
always cooked.  
If data is the representation of facts in a formalized manner, 
datafication is the act of rendering these representations into a format 
that can be communicated or manipulated by some process. 
Datafication can also be explained slightly differently. According to 
Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger and Kenneth Cukier, “To datafy a 
phenomenon is to put it in a quantified format so it can be tabulated 
and analyzed.”27 Datafication does not necessarily need to be 
quantified - represented as a numerical value - but it does need to be 
standardized through classification or categorization to be aggregated, 
processed, and analyzed computationally. “Counting is hungry for 
categories. Many of the categories we now use to describe people are 
byproducts of the needs of enumeration.”28 Datafication must be 
systematic categorization so that its objects can be counted and 
quantitatively analyzed, but need not be quantitative material.29 With 
this terminological foundation in place, I turn to big data. 
 
 
 
 
25 David M. Berry, The Computational Turn: Thinking About the Digital Humanities, 12 
CULTURE MACHINE (2011). 
26 GEOFFREY BOWKER, MEMORY PRACTICES IN THE SCIENCES 183 (2005). 
27 CUKIER & MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 3, at 78. 
28 Ian Hacking, Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed Numbers, 5 HUMANITIES IN SOC’Y 
279, 280 (1982). For instance, cookies may be descriptive, not quantified, but are lines of 
code that are recognized by a program that can aggregate and analyze the data. 
29 In fact, statistics did not become quantitative until around 1850 or 1860. Theodore 
Porter, Lawless Society: Social Science and the Reinterpretation of Statistics in Germany, 
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B. Big Data 
While big data is a new term, a comparison with the avalanche of 
numbers (the first wave of big data) reveals many similarities that 
provide insight into the socio-technical changes being experienced 
today. In this section, two pictures are painted - one of the second 
wave of big data we are experiencing now and one of the first wave of 
big data. I will spend significantly more time on the first wave, as it is 
a less familiar scene, but will expand on both in the sections to follow. 
The similarities in these pictures, categorized and further developed in 
Section III, serve as the basis for relying on this time period as a way 
of framing big data policy action.  
1. Second Wave Big Data 
A great deal of scholarship has described big data.  Ira Rubenstein 
offers a useful and concise description of the phenomenon: “‘Big data’ 
refers to novel ways in which organizations including government and 
businesses, combine diverse digital datasets and then use statistics 
and other datamining techniques to extract from them both hidden 
and surprising correlation.”30  
Today, big data is often described in terms of current computing 
power.  It refers to information sources that cannot be processed or 
analyzed using commonly available tools or techniques and has been 
characterized as “datasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical 
database software to capture, store or analyze.”31 This relative 
definition suggests that big data must always exist - there must always 
(or often) be some collection of data available that challenges 
commonly available processing equipment. The three commonly 
referenced characteristics of big data are relative as well: the three Vs 
(volume, velocity, and variety). In the big data transition, massive 
amounts of data are available (higher volume) from the number of 
sensors carried by individuals and objects and those that fill our 
physical space. Data comes in as a flood (faster velocity) across the 
                                                                                                                   
in THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION: VOL. 1: IDEAS IN HISTORY 352 (Lorenz Kruger, Lorraine 
J. Daston, & Michael Heidelberger, eds., 1987). 
30 Ira S. Rubenstein,  Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?,  3:2 INT’L DATA 
PRIVACY L. 74 (2013).  
31 McKinsey Global Institute, “Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, 
and Productivity,” (May 2011), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/ 
insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation. 
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network; it moves as quickly as the connection. And data comes in 
numerous forms from numerous new sources (more variety). 
Sometimes a fourth V, veracity, is included, which refers to the 
usability of the data, whether it is contextualized, accurate, up to date, 
clean, and generally maintained. Another notable attribute should be 
mentioned as well. Beyond the speed at which big data can move 
because of the networked world, boyd and Crawford explain that its 
relationality to other data is one of its main characteristics. “Big Data 
is fundamentally networked.”32 Data that is collected is intended to be 
combined with other data and aggregated across a number of 
contexts, and new ways of linking datasets has continued to generate 
new insights.33 
While the attributes of big data are impressive on their own, the 
big data transition is marked by what can be done with big data. Big 
data is mined, poked, and prodded to predict what will happen next. 
Processing vast stores of “historical” data (now virtually real-time 
data) leads to more accurate models – the time span has shrunk. The 
real-time speed at which many predictions can be made allows for the 
integration of predictions into everyday life. Companies, governments, 
and individuals take actions based on these predictions, not 
guarantees, which increase the likelihood of a desired result. Netflix 
predicts our movies, our houses change temperatures, cash registers 
print us coupons based on the past – these are things we regularly 
experience in our day to day lives. But more systematic adoption of 
predictive analytics is happening as well, like state parole boards using 
analytics to decide which inmates to release based on potential for 
recidivism,34 school systems integrating analytics in kindergarten to 
guide students through high school graduation based on their 
potential for success,35 and human resource departments choose and 
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track talent to make hiring and firing decisions based on predicted 
performance.36 
The innovative tools that have come with big data relate more to 
improved statistical and computational methods than the steady 
increase in computing power.37 Professor Gary King, social statistician 
at Harvard, uses “big algorithms” to analyze data on a laptop in twenty 
minutes that would have until recently required a $2 million 
computer.38 These tools and techniques are transferrable across 
disciplines, commercially, publicly, and individually, and to the 
masses. “There is a movement of quantification rumbling across fields 
in academia and science, industry and government and nonprofits… It 
is hard to find an area that hasn’t been affected.”39 
The commonly articulated characteristics of big data are relative in 
nature, suggesting only a difference in degree. But, the big data 
“revolution” suggests a fundamental change - difference in kind. 
danah boyd and Kate Crawford explain that big data is about more 
than scale, “It is a profound change at the levels of epistemology and 
ethics. It reframes key questions about the constitution of knowledge, 
the processes of research, how we should engage with information, 
and the nature and the categorization of reality.”40 This was certainly 
true of the period following the first wave of big data, which is detailed 
next to reveal remarkable similarities between the current second 
wave of big data and the avalanche of numbers, suggesting something 
big is on the way.  
 
2. First Wave Big Data 
 
“Almost no domain of human enquiry is left untouched by the 
events that I call the avalanche of numbers...”41 Ian Hacking explains 
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that the avalanche of printed numbers took place between 1820 and 
184042 across Europe.43 When the problems of society became visible 
and concentrated with urbanization and migration in the nineteenth 
century, “middle class and aristocratic reformers, philanthropists, 
professionals, civil servants, and humanitarians, gathered in statistical 
societies and voluntary associations, set out to do so by means of 
social surveys and investigations and pressured governments to do 
likewise.”44 Public agencies responded with official investigations and 
hearings, collection and dissemination of data, and creating new 
agencies that could focus on the task.45 
The systematic study of sickness rates was increasingly pursued 
after the plague, but was beginning to uncover correlation that 
provided some rhyme and reason to outbreak.46 These rates then 
began to be tied to data about regions and occupations, including daily 
employment activities supplied by companies like the East India 
Company.47 This led to massive collection and reporting on the poor, 
criminals, mental illness, etc., and ministries of justice data on crime, 
insanity, prostitution, vagabondage, vagrancy, and suicide were 
organized and disseminated.48 Commercial tables of figures were 
printed and rich education data was collected.49 The data sources from 
the avalanche of numbers were quickly combined to find 
correlations.50 New bureaucracies and jobs were created to collect 
data and to organize data-banks.51 “Disease, madness, and the state of 
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the threatening underworld, les misérables, created a morbid and 
fearful fascination for numbers upon which the bureaucracies fed.”52 
In other words, 1820-1840 could be labeled as first wave big data. The 
similarities to today are striking and are described in this section by 
looking at two countries: Great Britain and Germany.53 
Systematic statistical practices are traced to 18th century, when 
Prussian monarchies collected demographic qualitative data on their 
regions.54 The initially qualified data was used to make financial and 
military policy decisions for the state and shifted to quantitative data 
around the mid-19th century.55 Statistical analysis and control were 
taken up by many others beyond the state: 
[T]here were a large number of enthusiasts who 
measured and counted and put it all down in local, 
national, and international dailies, weeklies, monthlies, 
and yearbooks. No travel book was complete without 
its little summaries of statistics information about the 
town being traversed.56  
Prior to 1800, these parties were distinct. The Prussian authorities did 
not interfere with the statistical work performed by amateurs or 
universities but they refused, when asked, to release data or findings.57 
Then, in 1805, the Prussian Bureau of Statistics was established as a 
state operated statistical office that published data and findings to the 
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public. Many of the Bureau’s directors were university professors58 
and amateurs continued to publish their statistics as well59 creating an 
overlap between the public, the state, and academics that had 
previously not existed.  
In 1860, the Bureau was directed by Ernst Engel who sought 
complete enumeration and direct collection. This meant that everyone 
should be counted, as opposed to sampling, through a process called 
individual bulletins, which were sent directly to individuals, rather 
than being collected by churches or municipal organizers.60 
Today’s parallels to the avalanche of numbers and associated 
datafication practices are notable, as are the level and nature of 
criticism and debate in their own time. Germans were reluctant to 
understand the world through a quantified lens, because such a 
mechanical perspective “flattened the delicate social contours.”61 They 
were unconvinced it could capture the essence and quirks of society. 
Embraced in a different way, parallels can be found in 19th 
century England, but with a stronger push from the bottom in a 
decreasingly top-down world in which a middle class had emerged. 
Data as a democratic tool was a concept that took hold during this 
period. As Karl Metz explains: 
Having been an amalgamation of descriptive 
information on the peculiarities and ‘curiosities’ of a 
given country, [statistics] now became synonymous 
with gathering figures and arranging them to form 
averages. It was no longer... exclusively the statesman 
for whom such work was done; the public was also 
regarded as a legitimate audience for the statistical 
message.62  
Industrialization spurred massive migration shifts to urban areas 
that placed significant strain on infrastructure, leading to new issues 
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of disease and sanitation, as well as new forms of work, financial 
exchange, food importation challenges, and burdens on the poor.63 
People reached for quantification when chaos from a massive shift in 
the sociotechnical world ensued. The middle class found these social 
metrics refreshing as objective ways to measure a man, particularly 
appealing in a time when social mobility had become newly 
imaginable. Charles Babbage’s appeal for a 19th century equivalent of 
a data center expresses the enthusiasm for universal datafication in 
1832: 
Amongst those works of science which are too large 
and too laborious for individual efforts, and are 
therefore fit objects to be undertaken by united 
academies, I wish to point out one which seems 
eminently necessary at the present time, and which 
would be of the greatest advantage to all classes of the 
scientific world. I would propose that its title should be 
‘The Constants of Nature and of Art.’ It ought to 
contain all those facts which can be expressed by 
numbers in various sciences and arts.64 
Of course, the State was tightly tied to this movement. Rejected in 
1753 just prior to the industrial revolution, a bill was passed in 1800 in 
England that required the regular collection of population data to 
ensure “certainty [over] conjecture.”65 And, again great effort was put 
into enumeration, not sampling, in order to heighten accuracy and 
increase control, but these practices led to less accuracy. The 
categories chosen, method of collection, level of ability to respond, 
bias of the designer and collector, language and literacy limitations, 
etc., all led to inaccuracy with the arrogant assumption of total 
information awareness, to use a modern term.66 Through the 
establishment of the General Register Office in 1837, many of the 
kinks in data collection were worked out or acknowledged and the 
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findings and conclusions qualified.67 Enumeration was thereafter 
defined as “being in respect of the individuals present on a specified 
night.”68  
Critics voiced their concerns about these limitations and dangers 
as datafication enthusiasm swept Britain. “The attitude that counting 
men instead of weighing them, which was generally ascribed to the 
statisticians by their critics, was unbearable... Statistics, they claimed, 
reduced men to averages, to a mean man that only existed in one’s 
fantasy.”69 As early as 1790 Edmund Burke wrote, “But the age of 
chivalry is gone – That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has 
succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished for it.”70 Even in 
the 19th century, these critics felt the ironic and familiar pressure to 
“bolster their moral objections with some statistics to support their 
case.”71 French social economist Jean-Baptiste Say argued that 
statistics were descriptive only and could not identify underlying laws 
about the universe.72 Doctors were particularly opposed to the use of 
statistical probability, because medicine was founded on the judgment 
of human physicians dealing with individual patients and her 
complexities. In 1836 at the Academy of Medicine in Paris, probability 
in medicine was argued by Risueno d’Amador to be anti-scientific and 
anti-medical seeking “not to cure this or that disease, but to cure the 
most possible out of a certain number.”73  
As these two examples reveal, in many ways the big data issues 
confronting us today confronted Europe in the 1800s. In a landscape 
where data seemed to be coming from every direction and new 
sources at tremendous speeds, new techniques for gathering and 
analyzing data were created to turn the numbers into actionable 
knowledge. Private data was mixed with public data, commercial with 
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government, health with education. Governments have never been the 
only entity numbering people. Companies, organizations, and 
individuals were important players in the first wave of big data.  
Beyond their use by government to structure Britain and Germany 
(as well as other European countries and the United States), the 
numbers that fell in the avalanche of numbers were associated with a 
shift in science that reached nearly every field of study. A number of 
fields borrowed, commented on, and refined techniques from other 
disciplines during this transitive period. 
One strand of probability theory served as the calculus by which 
an individual could and should form beliefs and direction under 
uncertainty, and another used by non-experimental natural scientists 
used it to establish best estimates and to minimize human error in 
measurements. Although the first strand of probability theory seems 
more naturally suited for a human science, it was the latter that took 
root in the social sciences in the form of social physics between 1830 
and 1860. A good part of the nineteenth century was consumed by 
social scientists attempting to discover “the laws which govern men’s 
habits and the principles of human nature, upon which the structure 
of society and its movement depends,” explained Lord Brougham at a 
meeting of the Social Science Association in 1857.74 Also called social 
physics by Adolphe Quetelet,75 analogies between man and machine 
ran wild,76 but were not without their critics, and quickly gave way to 
the similar and more popular ideas of Emile Durkheim, who 
continued to seek social laws through statistics.77 “The world, it was 
said, might often look haphazard, but only because we do not know 
the inevitable workings of its inner springs. As for probabilities – 
whose mathematics was called the doctrine of chances – they were 
merely the defective but necessary tools of people who know too 
little.”78  
 
 
 
 
74 Oberschall, supra note 44, at 106, citing quote from Stephen Cole, Continuity in 
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2015] AMBROSE 221 
 
Despite fervent opposition from social scientists like Auguste 
Comte, who argued statistics smeared together too many aspects of 
society in transition and was annoyed by the appropriation of his term 
“social physics” instead coining the new term “sociology” to distance 
himself, statistics and probabilistic modeling became an integral part 
of sociology.79 Debates within the social sciences about the 
appropriate use, meaning, and implications of utilizing large datasets, 
statistical analysis, and probabilistic theory were wide ranging. The 
regularity of crime statistics sparked a debate about whether 
responsibility lay on a small subset of the population (the 
“malevolence of certain individuals”) or the community for the 
existence of a small general penchant for crime in each of us (“the 
average man”).80  
While social sciences adhered to a severe strand of determinism, it 
was highly influential to physics which was undoubtedly 
indeterministic by the twentieth century. Quetelet believed “The 
legislator must not seek to block the historical path of the social body, 
but he can hope to avoid the perturbations to which it is subject. It is 
the task of social physics to identify each force of perturbations, so 
that it can be nullified an equal and opposite force.”81 Quetelet’s 
shifting interest from astronomy to sociology when he encountered 
anthropometric data that appeared to show distribution similar to the 
error curve. In this similarity, he saw nature aiming at a true value, 
but accidental influences had produced inaccuracies and errors. The 
same error curve was found in marriage, suicide, crime, etc., and 
Quetelet saw the same attempt at natural truth. Although he adhered 
to an eighteenth century sense of the regularities his techniques 
revealed, probabilities regularities, as understood in the nineteenth 
century, were quickly and effectively incorporated by physicists. Moral 
statistic had developed the building blocks for modeling higher level 
order from lower level processes. The kinetic theory of gases and 
statistical physics, and the field would progress to become decidedly 
indeterministic by the twentieth century. 
Similarly, Francis Galton, who pioneered heredity and eugenics, 
also saw something special in Quetelet’s application of the error curve, 
and it became the basis for his work on understanding variation in 
and transmission of individual characteristics within different 
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populations. Galton progressed along these lines to develop 
correlation and regression – important tools for sociologists. Of 
course, eventually the question of why deviations from the mean in 
moral statistics should be considered errors in the same way they are 
in observations of celestial bodies was posed to sociologists, 
conceptual divides between observations versus statistics and means 
versus deviation were presented, and distance grew between the fields 
again. Numerous fields contributed to the development of statistical 
methods and probabilistic ideas: for instance, biology studies 
launched the analysis of correlation, educational psychology launched 
analysis of factors, and eugenics and agronomy launched analysis of 
variance.  
This may imply a kind of comradery across disciplines, but some, 
discussed below,82 took issue with the application of their approaches 
and theories to other fields and some disciplines simply were not 
intellectually positioned to incorporate techniques or ideas until later 
in the century.83 Still, all fields of study dealt with and handled the 
idea of probability, chance, determinism, and errors differently - some 
rejected it, some debated and split, and some became fully 
probabilistic.84 Although the fields that became statistical in the 
nineteenth century were those that dealt with a single entity or 
phenomena that were overwhelmingly large or complex, probabilistic 
thinking shook all fields of inquiry and society in a way that has 
shaped our modern world.85 We are now capable of seeing the world 
through probabilities: climate change, cancer, robberies, employment, 
sports, and dating all may be understood in probabilistic terms. 
This capability is a product of the probabilistic revolution, and 
these first wave big data shifts were part of the probabilistic 
revolution, spanning 1840-1930. Prior to 1840, theories of probability 
were used to “manage the imperfections of human observation and 
reasoning.”86 While once only discussed in terms of gambling and 
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luck, Jakob Bernoulli (seeking to model the reasonableness and good 
sense of an “impartial judge”) and his nephew Nicholas Bernoulli 
(seeking to economic self-interested “canny merchant”)87 turned their 
attention to more serious subject matters like wine, futures, annuities, 
insurance, dowry funds, and returns from mills – none of which were 
structured mathematically – to find broader applicability and more 
legitimacy for the study of probabilities.88 Theories developed and 
refined by Bayes, Price, and Laplace over the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century were highly contested; they often were understood 
as arguments against God, moral agency, and scientific certainty. 
Thomas Bayes sought to quantify what could be learned when starting 
with a guess or belief and updating it as more information became 
available in the early 1700s. Richard Price refined, disseminated, and 
found use for Bayes theorem in the mid-1700s, which was further 
refined and developed by Pierre-Simon Laplace in the late 1700s. As 
the ideas central to and related to probabilities took shape between 
these extraordinary men, as well as others, probability was associated 
with human belief, imperfection, subjectivity, and imprecision. It was 
therefore, not easily understood as a serious scientific pursuit. 
However, as attempts to model the “reasonable man” (which included 
asking well respected gentlemen what they would do in a given 
situation and comparing mathematical results to confirm their 
legitimacy) gave way to understanding large scale populations and 
systems, probability began to gain popularity and acceptability.89  
Laplace was certainly a big data scientist. He was increasingly 
frustrated by inaccurate, imprecise, or conflicting data and sought to 
refine the data in his sets by aggregating large data sets from different 
time periods, sources, and locations.90 He sought maximum 
objectivity so as to calculate and minimize human subjectivity.  By the 
beginning of the nineteenth century it was widely held that the world 
was ruled by the same mechanics of physics and represented by 
numerical constants.91 The early part of the period was dominated by 
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Pierre Simon de Laplace’s dictum, “All events, even those which by 
their insignificance, seem not to follow from the great laws of the 
universe, follow from them just as necessarily as the revolutions of the 
sun.”92 Statistics were valued for their potential to establish and 
support social order. “Ironically, the great improvement in accuracy of 
demographic, economic, anthropometric, and social records early in 
the nineteenth century reduced dependence on probability. The 
difference between statistics and political arithmetic, according to a 
common nineteenth-century view, was precisely that the former had 
been freed from reliance on estimates and conjectures, and could 
aspire to near-perfect accuracy.”93 Previously associated with fate or 
luck, by the eighteenth century chance had come to be understood as 
the absence of divine design and in the nineteenth century as lack of 
control or knowledge. By the early 1900s, statistical practices and 
theory developed around the idea of probabilities and indeterminacy 
took hold. The probabilistic revolution produced a post-1930s world 
“run at best by laws of chance.”94 
This is not to suggest that the landscape during the first wave big 
of data is identical to the one we have today. While the landscapes are 
significantly different, a comparison allows us to extract the issues 
that concerned the population two hundred years ago to understand 
what questions are (1) not new, but inherent, to datafication practices, 
(2) accompany waves of big data, and (3) associated with structural 
changes to data practices. 
III. BIG DATA TRANSITIONS 
 These two time periods share a number of similarities, but one is 
still in its infancy and the other reflected upon as part of an epistemic 
and ethical shift that changed the world. In this section, I extract and 
categorize some of the similarities from the above description of each 
wave to better assess big data’s revolutionary nature and the 
challenges posed to data protection. 
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A. Lures of Big Data 
 
Datafication’s potential for novel, transformative, big data-
based knowledge has been greeted with a level of enthusiasm that 
cannot be overstated. Gary King of the Harvard School of Public 
Health stated, “People are literally dying every day simply because 
data are not being shared.” The quote reads as extreme but in 
retrospect, the avalanche of numbers produced nothing less.  
It is certainly not true that most applications of the new 
statistical knowledge were evil. One may suspect the 
ideology of the great Victorian social reformers and still 
grant that their great fight for sanitation, backed by 
statistical enquiries, was the most important single 
amelioration of the epoch. Without it most of you 
would not exist, for your great-great...-grandparents 
would never have lived to puberty.95 
When articulated this way, the first wave of big data actually did save 
lives. 
The social gains projected by the second wave of big data rely on 
universal datafication that is shared and applied without hurdles from 
the division between disciplines, public and private, commercial and 
non-commercial, macro and micro. Chris Anderson of Wired writes, 
“This is a world where massive amounts of data and applied 
mathematics replace every other tool that might be brought to bear. 
Out with every theory of human behavior, from linguistics to 
sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology.”96     
Five perceptions and prospects of datafication that promote new 
potential for progress are shared by both waves of big data. First, data 
provides a standard, common vocabulary that promotes sharing 
across disparate and previously siloed parties. Second, data enables 
numerical control and understanding of systems through feedback.  
Third, the widely held perception that knowledge expressed and 
supported numerically possesses a high level of objectivity. Fourth, 
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knowledge is considered out there to be discovered, not something 
that is produced. And finally, the possibility of enumeration – the idea 
that so much knowledge can be gained through complete datafication. 
Although these lures also drove the first wave of big data, they are not 
inherent questions for datafication. They could be considered 
common traps that societies experiencing an influx of data fall into, 
but are not necessarily shared across time and cultures. They are an 
integral part of understanding the movement toward datafication and 
its governance. 
1. Standardized Sharing 
Datafication promises to enable sharing of information by 
expressing objects, characteristics, and phenomena in standard, 
commonly understood language. Such standardization promotes 
sharing across disciplines, geographies, industries and institutions.  
Using the common language of data to describe and analyze 
occurrences and events, researchers can more easily connect areas of 
research. Galton saw statistics as a way of connecting fields and 
applicable to many forms of knowledge, quickly realizing his 
correlation principle developed as part of his eugenics research could 
be a method for evaluating interrelation between variables in 
general.97 By 1889, correlation was being used in anthropometry, 
sociology, economics, psychology, and education.98 Tying fields 
together with data tested the applicability of statistical methods and 
theories to a range of areas.99 For instance, Galton incorporate the 
data points created by French criminologist Alphonse Bertillon, which 
included the height and finger, arm, and foot length for criminals, in 
order to determine the nature of their entanglement with other 
data.100  
Today big data enthusiasts are calling for the modern day 
equivalent of Babbage’s ‘The Constants of Nature and of Art,’ that 
would express all facts from the arts and science in numbers. 
Datafication is understood to make possible new connections between 
new sources of information and areas of inquiry – connecting data 
 
 
 
 
97 GERD GIGERENZER, ET AL., supra note 70, at 58. 
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collected and maintained offline with that gathered and stored online; 
location data with purchasing data; government data with commercial 
data, and data about the humanities with data about the social 
sciences. Data.gov holds datasets from different agencies posted for 
public consumption101 and individuals that monitor their daily health 
habits as part of the quantified self movement continue push for more 
ways to access and share their personal data.102 The World Bank103 
and the United Nations104 have created platforms for the innovative 
use of their data. Acxiom collects, stores, processes, and sells 
information on over 500 million active users with around 1,500 data 
points for each.105 Initiatives like university sponsored MOOCs106 
collect and share data on tens of thousands of users to better 
understand how students learn different concepts and topics and how 
educational resources should be used, and recently partnered with 
Google.107 Commercial markets, government, and universities have 
embraced the notion that datafication yield new forms of knowledge, 
creates research efficiencies, and eliminates barriers that currently 
exist between disciplines when shared.  
 
2. Feedback and Control 
 
Representing phenomena through data makes it possible to 
control a system though a feedback loop. In a feedback loop the 
output of a system is fed back into the controller which will adjust the 
 
 
 
 
101 “Data Catalog,” Data.gov, http://catalog.data.gov/dataset. 
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SLATE (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/ 
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103 “World Bank Open Data: Free and Open Access to Data About Development in 
Countries Around the Globe,” The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/. 
104 “United Nations Global Pulse,” United Nations, http://www.unglobalpulse.org/. 
105 Natasha Singer, “You For Sale: Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome,” N.Y. 
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107 “We Are Joining the Open edX platform,” Google Research Blog (Sept. 10, 2013), 
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system to attain some goal.108 Feedback loops most relevant to big 
data are controlled by computational algorithms. Today, datafication 
practices involve109 aggregation, classification, association, 
segmentation, sequencing, and otherwise mining for knowledge that 
the algorithm assesses input data against and provides an output – 
and the output data is fed back into the algorithm which will adjust 
based on the feedback. But, feedback loops need not be a complex 
computational algorithm.  
Although the census projects that popped up across Europe at the 
beginning of the probabilistic revolution represented an attempt to 
collect data, analyze it, act upon it, and feed the resulting data back 
into the resource distribution analysis to make further adjustments, 
this particular lure gained momentum toward the end of the 
probabilistic revolution and has not slowed down. In the late 1800s 
Frederick Winslow Taylor implemented a theory of scientific 
management with the goal of revolutionizing efficiency and 
dramatically improving productivity on the factory floor.110  To do so, 
he separated tasks performed into discrete, unambiguous elements.  
Broken down in this way, productivity could be assessed and managed 
by expert managers continually comparing the maximum possible 
 
 
 
 
108 Feedback loops may best be explained by comparison of open versus closed loop control 
systems. For example, a clothes dryer that operates by tumbling clothing in a heated drum 
until the level of moisture measured in the drum reaches a certain level benefits from a 
feedback loop.  The dryer constantly received information about the amount of moisture in 
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control system. An example of an open loop control system is a dryer that runs for the 
amount of time input into the system by the operator.  
109 The importance of this closed system feedback loop as a form of knowing suggests that 
simply representing information in a transferrable format is too narrow a concept for big 
data discourse. Julie Cohen focuses on modulation, defined as “a set of processes in which 
the quality and content of surveillant attention is continually modified according to the 
subject’s own behavior, sometimes in response to inputs from the subject but according to 
logics that ultimately are outside the subject’s control.” Datafication is a necessary step in 
modulation, but modulation refers to the algorithmic process, whereas datafication refers 
to the representational process. Reflecting on the history of statistics in The Politics of 
Large Numbers, Alain Desrosieres discusses this difference, “The rationality of a decision, 
be it individual or collective, is linked to its ability to derive support from things that have a 
stable meaning, allowing comparisons to be made and equivalences to be established.” 
Alain Desrosieres, supra note 54, at 6. For the purposes of big data discussions (both now 
and from the past), the two are necessarily linked and contribute the growing perception 
that big data practices are synonyms with modern competitiveness. For the sake of 
simplicity, we will continue to use the term datafication to embody both the act of forming 
representations and the processes that follow. 
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output to the actual output and adjusting the work process 
accordingly. Planning and administering work processes in this way 
treated man and machine as one single feedback loop and became 
known as Taylorism.111 In order to achieve highly efficient and precise 
production, factories relied increasingly on mechanical controllers. 
David Noble explained that this kind of numerical control “allowed 
management to achieve through mechanical methods objectives that 
had to that point been dealt with by organizational means.”112 Norbert 
Wiener expanded the application of feedback and control to all 
systems as he developed the field of cybernetics. “The language of 
servo-mechanisms, self-regulation, feedback loops and control loops, 
it was claimed, applied to all – mechanical, natural, social, human – 
processes.”113 Man-machine systems were constructed and analyzed as 
feedback loops, which required human actions and attributes to be 
machine readable (datafied). 
Today, companies are beginning to engage in datafication 
practices by collecting data from sensors worn by employees that 
allow them to analyze data to identify problems, efficiencies, and 
correlations and enable them to make adjustments to their processes 
and utilize their employees in more effective ways.  These practices 
trace their roots to Taylorism, numerical control, and cybernetics.114 
Just as Taylor intended, the practice is applied far beyond work 
environments. The quantified self-movement, wherein individuals 
incorporate technology to monitor their inputs, states, and 
performance (also explained as “self-knowledge through numbers”)115 
can also be understood as individual efforts to establish control 
through feedback loops. The idea that the world is made up solely of 
information, as digital physics, for instance, suggests that everything 
 
 
 
 
111 This type of scientific management permeated throughout American culture, but 
remained more selectively dispersed throughout Europe, where the commitment to 
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in the universe is nothing but 1s and 0s controlled through a giant 
feedback loop.116  
 
3. Objectivity 
 
Related to standardized sharing and closed loop systems is the 
powerful perception of increased objectivity attendant to datafied 
understandings of the world. Objectivity is synonymous with realism, 
referring to one’s ability to know things as they actually are, while 
subjectivity refers to beliefs that exist only in the mind.117 The 
statistical societies that popped up in the later half of the nineteenth 
century were devoted to neutral knowledge, which required routine, 
mechanical, and precise data practices.118 The London Statistical 
Society adhered to the rule that required the exclusion of all 
opinions.119 Or as William Farr explained, “The dryer the better. 
Statistics should be the driest of all reading.”120 The perceived 
objectivity of the first wave of big data was attractive to societies not 
only because the early probability debates had left large scale objective 
statistics the winner, but also because statistical probability 
represented an alternative was the subjective whim of authority. The 
lure of objectivity is hard to resist, particularly because of its vital role 
in representative democracies. 
“The American mind seems extremely vulnerable to the belief that 
any alleged knowledge which can be expressed in figures is in fact as 
final and exact as the figures in which it is expressed.”121 Mechanical 
objectivity has particular appeal to the wider public, because it implies 
following rules - a check on subjectivity.122 Representative 
democracies are laden with mechanical objectivity (e.g., judicial 
impartiality and reliance on precedent), because “[t]hose whose 
authority is suspect, and who are obliged to deal with an involved and 
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suspicious public, are much more likely to make their decisions by the 
numbers than are those who govern by divine or hereditary right.”123  
Enthusiasm for increased objectivity in education policy, for 
instance, has roots in curriculum tracking124 and SATs,125 but spurred 
a number of recent efforts including “evidence-based” education 
policies126 and education analytics for K-12 schools127 to support 
decisions about where and how to spend resources that are beyond 
political reproach. It is no less true for companies, organizations, and 
individuals. “Quantification is a way of making decisions without 
seeming to decide.”128 
 
4. Knowledge Discovery versus Production 
 
A search of Google Books suggests that “knowledge discovery,” as 
a term used outside the education and law, took hold in the late 1970s 
with datamining. While a new big data-based nature of inquiry is 
being shaped - where knowledge is discovered, not produced – the 
avalanche of numbers was associated with the discovery of knowledge 
as well. The “erosion of determinism” Hacking refers to is the 
movement from social laws to “the taming of chance,”129 or an 
understanding of the world in probabilistic terms that occurred over 
the long probabilistic revolution. The shift away from determinism 
 
 
 
 
123 Theodore M. Porter, Objectivity as Standardization: The Rhetoric of Impersonality in 
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has important implications for our conversation today. Throughout 
the 1800s, if statistics showed that one in five people committed 
suicide, the figures were understood to mean that 10% of all people do 
kill themselves. Probability allows us to talk about these numbers in 
terms of chance and likelihood as opposed to laws and truths.  
Today the movement toward universal datafication and knowledge 
discovery carries the tones of determinism and mathematical realism. 
Mathematical realism holds that humans do not invent mathematics 
but discover truth of the mathematical reality. The second wave of big 
data has revitalized optimism for understanding the laws that govern 
us as individuals and societies. Social physics, for example, is the term 
used by Alex Pentland in his 2014 book.130 Acknowledging that it is an 
idea over two centuries old, Pentland argues that new tools for 
collecting and analyzing big data on human interaction can uncover 
the laws of social physics.131  
 
5. Enumeration 
  
Enumeration relates to all of the other lures – datafying 
everything is an important aspect of the drive to objectively share, 
discover, and control systems, as opposed to sampling or specifying 
what is and is not part of the inquiry. But enumeration has a 
distinctive, consistent characteristic that warrants its own category. 
Prior to the end of the probabilistic revolution, probabilistic inference 
from samples to population were not known or practiced in social or 
political statics. During the avalanche of numbers, both Britain and 
Germany were incredibly optimistic about collecting and processing 
data across their societies through systematic collection of all 
individuals or processes or transactions. Today, big data efforts 
attempt to capture all voters, all drivers, all relationships to discover 
new insights through correlations between previously uncaptured or 
unaggregated data. It may seem naïve for European countries to have 
assumed they could capture all their citizens and their needs in a 
census, but today we are attempting to use big data to map the 
brain.132 
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B. Datafication Attributes 
Some of the issues that arise during big data periods have nothing 
to do with the influx of data. These are attributes that come along with 
datafication no matter its size, speed, or variety. Thus, datafication 
attributes refer to those questions that are inherent and ever-present 
and revisited during waves of big data.  
 
1. Governability 
 
Datafication makes us governable. It allows us to be both 
accounted for systematically, offering recognition and protection to 
those that may have been previously overlooked or underrepresented, 
as well as controlled and manipulated. Michel Foucault offers two 
important ideas relevant to the big data debate. First, his work 
explains that some of the issues are very old and the second is the 
concept he called governmentality (what I will call governability). In 
his lecture on governmentality, Foucault described the shift away from 
feudalism, focused on ruling territory prior to the 16th century, 
toward modern government, focused on ruling people after the 17th 
century - the development of the “art of government.”133 This ‘art’ 
relied on statistics, numbering individuals and understanding the 
aggregate of a population.134 Early government utilization of statistical 
practices in the 16th century developed around health information 
initially as disease control, attempting to understand spread, death 
rates, and causes.  
During the first wave of big data, the idea that governments could 
improve health, crime, education, and other important social concerns 
with data spurred novel collection and analysis efforts. The concerns 
around the modern quant business mantra “if you can’t measure it, 
                                                                                                                   
information-management/obama-brain-mapping-project-tests-big-data-limits/d/d-
id/1109355. 
133 Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN 
GOVERNMENTALITY 87-104 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, & Peter Miller, eds., 1978). 
134 Sam Fried offers a fascinating critique of Foucault’s theory of governmentality, arguing 
that not only is government use of statistics an exercise of control and form of power but 
the revocation and exclusive use of statistics and quantification can also exert control over 
and disempower the citizenship. Sam Fried, Quantify This: Statistics, The State, and 
Governmentality, unpublished thesis (2014) (available by request at 
cctprogram@georgetown.edu). 
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you can’t manage it”135 are reminiscent of Foucault's concern that 
recording and measuring human activity after the plague creates both 
order and control.  
 
2. Data-Based Knowledge 
 
The first wave of big data presented opportunities for intervention 
and thoughtful planning but carried significant, though overlooked, 
limitations and misunderstandings. To datafy something is to 
necessarily reduce it to make it useful as standardized and 
transferable. The limitations in what can be known given that inherent 
reduction as well as the current tools, techniques, and social foresight 
at our disposal will always be an issue for datafication. 
Germany and Great Britain had different responses to data-based 
knowledge. Germans found this type of knowledge incredibly limited 
in its capacity to capture the essence of a person,136 while the English 
middle class were enthusiastic about being portrayed by numbers 
instead of one’s lot in life and the neat, orderly world quantification 
promised.137 Because of the reductive nature of datafication, data-
based knowledge is assessed differently by the cultures that it 
develops within. It may be accepted as just one way to produce 
knowledge, the best way to produce knowledge, or even an inherently 
flawed way to produce knowledge.  
 Today, cultures around the world are asking questions about what 
data-based knowledge should mean to them, while others may “miss 
out on the big data boom” and be further distanced from wealthier 
nations.138 For instance, a study on the variation between American 
and European perceptions of big data found that 43% of Europeans 
versus 53% of Americans believe data collection can bring the general 
public more secure and 41% of Europeans believe that big data results 
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2014), at http://www.forbes.com/sites/lizryan/2014/02/10/if-you-cant-measure-it-you-
cant-manage-it-is-bs/. 
136 Porter, Lawless Society: Social Science and the Reinterpretation of Statistics in 
Germany, 1850-1880, supra note 29, at 352. 
137 Metz, supra note 57, at 337-350. 
138 Mike Orcutt, “Poorer Countries Stand to Miss Out on the Big Data Boom,” MIT TECH. 
REV. (Apr. 25, 2014),   http://www.technologyreview.com/ view/526941/poorer-countries-
stand-to-miss-out-on-the-big-data-boom/. 
2015] AMBROSE 235 
 
in access to lower prices versus 66% of Americans.139 Recently, there 
has been a backlash from traditional US news outlets to the big data 
hype pointing to its many flaws.140 Reliance on and purposes for data-
based knowledge continues to be a question today as new ways of 
collecting and processing data are developed.  
 
3. Classification Effects 
 
Datafication is both natural141 (because classification based on 
prior experience is how we make sense of the world142) and unnatural 
(because the way information is represented is necessarily mediated 
by modern culture and tools143). Although intentional abuses by way 
of data-based social order that rely on classification144 have certainly 
occurred, well-meaning yet harmful impacts have also occurred. 
Caused by the systematic and democratized provision of services 
through the classification aspect of datafication, these unintended 
consequences and harms are not easy to identify in their own time.  
For instance, recidivism was a concept conceived in the early 
1800s when criminal behavior first was studied statistically. But, that 
simple idea and the probabilities associated with it have had 
significant impacts on our social structure giving rise to changes in 
employment practices, penal codes, prison structures, and inter-
personal relationships which fundamentally change an individual’s 
life upon conviction. This is not something that has been resolved over 
the centuries. Danielle Citron analyzed Colorado’s public benefits 
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system that required eligibility workers to enter whether a potential 
recipient is a “beggar.”145 Today, anyone with a smart phone or 
participating online is filtered into classification systems encoded in 
machine-readable formats. “Classification is the foundation of 
targeting and tailoring information and experiences to individuals. Big 
data promises - or threatens - to bring classification to an increasing 
range of human activity.”146 Classification choices, determinations, 
and their impacts are inherent in aspects of datafication and are 
difficult to uncover and understand. 
 
C. Structural Changes 
 
Big data-based inquiry is not limited to “scientists.” As Section I 
illustrates, data-based understanding has penetrated nearly every 
corner of society (except perhaps legal scholarship) from the most 
micro level to the most macro. Here the structural changes to data 
labor, method, and theory that occurred and are occurring are 
discussed.  
 
1. Division of Data Labor 
 
A hefty supply of data during the avalanche of numbers was 
available, in part, because of the division of data labor. Previously, 
data collection was performed by a priest, a mayor, a lone researcher, 
or a reformer.147 By the mid-1800s, statistical societies had formed to 
pool their resources, like a modern meetup or hackathon. Professional 
interviewers and tabulators were hired and grants and prizes were 
awarded for statistical advancements.148 Soon, the release of statistics 
to a data-hungry public was delegated to departments within 
agencies.149 
Big data-based knowledge is derived from a work flow in which 
labor is divided amongst a number of parties. In the first wave of big 
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data, structural changes occurred when the state began to seek data 
directly from the source (households) by cutting out players in 
municipalities and parishes that served as middle men. The state 
created arrangements with corporate and civic organizations, and the 
data collected was analyzed by various parties and shared with the 
public. However, this was not necessarily an organized or efficient 
endeavor. It appears to have been ad hoc and project-specific. 
Today, those who collect the data are not those who manage it or 
those who analyze it. Often analysis is performed on data the user has 
not directed in any way. “The new model is for the data to be captured 
by instruments or generated by simulations before being processed by 
software and for the resulting information or knowledge to be stored 
in computers. Scientists only get to look at their data fairly late in this 
pipeline,” explained Jim Gray in 2007.150 Gray described a project 
where the designer of the instruments collecting the data is different 
than the designer of the software who is someone other than the 
scientist. Collection, curation, management, processing and analysis 
were previously done by a single team that had control over the 
direction of each. This statement does not sufficiently communicate 
the significant distance between parties involved in big data analytics. 
For some projects, those performing the analysis may have some say 
in collection, management, and processing by selecting, directing, or 
designing the tools used for those tasks, but often data is collected by 
someone, packaged by another, and analyzed by a data scientist across 
completely different social contexts. There has always been a division 
between those that discover statistical insights and those that apply 
them, but the division of labor in big data-based knowledge discovery 
today changes the role of each laborer involved and the process.  
Those who collect will collect as much as possible. Those who 
package it will package based on their potential users. Those who 
analyze it will look for anything and everything the data may reveal. 
Those who use or apply data knowledge are further removed than 
ever. Standardized sharing and a data market drive this division, and 
the efficiency of such a system is hard to ignore. In 2009, President 
Obama signed the Memorandum on Transparency and Open 
Government,151 which led to the creation of the data.gov site, where 
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federal agencies are required to deliver data sets.152 The government, 
like many online sites and services, is a collector, cooking the data a 
certain way in hopes that it will be of value to someone downstream.153 
Unlike the government, companies will not openly share the data they 
collect but sell it to a broker or partner. Data markets have emerged as 
platforms for exchange between collectors, processors, and users, 
serving as the middle men that create value through resale and 
analytic services. Even traditional research universities have seen the 
value in outsourcing data collection and management154 asking not 
“how can I produce this data?” but “where can I find it?” or “what is 
available?” 
 
2. Methodological Disruption 
 
Statistical methods grew in leaps and bounds during the 
probabilistic revolution: least squares,155 frequentist statistics,156 and 
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156 Frequentist statistics or probability describes the likelihood of an event occurring within 
a random experimentation or sampling. Working from Poisson’s 1837 book (RECHERCHES 
SUR LA PROBABILITÉ DES JUGEMENTS EN MATIÈRE CRIMINELLE ET EN MATIÈRE CIVILE or 
“Researches into the Probabilities of Judgments in Criminal and Civil Cases,” Robert Leslie 
Ellis (On the Foundations of the Theory of Probabilities) and Antoine Augustin Cournot 
(Exposition de la théorie des chances et des probabilités), as well as others published work 
on this approach in the late 1830s, but frequentist probability was heavily investigated and 
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correlation157 were all introduced, refined, and practiced over the 
1800s. The law of large numbers, originally proved by Jakob Bertoulli 
in 1713, was significantly refined and practiced by Siméon Denis 
Poisson who coined the phrase in 1837. Statistical societies that 
formed across France, Germany, and the U.S. were most abundant in 
Great Britain where the International Statistical Congresses met 
regularly after 1853.158 These societies as well as the official statistical 
offices created at the end of the Eighteenth Century sought to craft 
and required collection and presentation be processed routinely, 
mechanically, and thoroughly.159 However, these are not structural 
changes to methodology. Rather, this was a period where the scientific 
method taught to elementary school children was refined. The linear 
scientific method is to: 
 
1. Define a question 
 
2. Gather information and resources (observe) 
3. Form an explanatory hypothesis 
4. Test the hypothesis by performing an experiment and 
collecting data in a reproducible manner 
5. Analyze the data 
6. Interpret the data and draw conclusions that serve as a starting 
point for new hypothesis 
7. Publish results 
                                                                                                                   
developed by John Venn in 1866 (THE LOGIC OF CHANCE: AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS 
AND PROVINCE OF THE THEORY OF PROBABILITY).  
157 Broadly, correlation is statistical relationship involving dependence.  Sir Francis 
Galton's diligent research on inherited characteristics of peas led to the conceptualization 
of linear regression (NATURAL INHERITANCE, 5TH ED. (1894)). Later efforts by both Galton 
and Karl Pearson developed the more sophisticated technique of multiple regression 
Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution. III. Regression, Heredity and 
Panmixia, PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON, 187, 253-318 
(1896). 
158 GERD GIGERENZER, ET AL., supra note 70, at 38. 
159 Id. 
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8. Retest  
 
In the late 1800s randomization in experimentation and sampling and 
optimal experiment design for regression were developed around a 
new understanding of error rates and probability.160  
In 1874, still prior to a sophisticated and accepted understanding 
of probability and the quantification of uncertainty, William Stanley 
Jevons wrote of the inappropriate use of methodology applied to 
social data: 
No one will be found to deny that there are certain 
uniformities of thinking and acting which can be 
detected in reasoning beings, and so far as we detect 
such laws we successfully apply scientific method. But 
those who attempt thus to establish social and moral 
sciences, soon become aware that they are dealing with 
subjects of enormous complexity. Take, for instance, 
the science of Political Economy. If a science at all, it 
must be a mathematical science, because it deals with 
quantities of commodities. But so soon as we attempt 
to draw out the equations expressing the laws of 
variation of demand and supply, we discover that they 
must have a complexity entirely surpassing our powers 
of mathematical treatment. We may lay down the 
general form of the equations, expressing the demand 
and supply for two or three commodities among two or 
three trading bodies, but all the functions involved are 
of so complicated a character that there is not much 
fear of scientific method making a rapid progress in 
this direction.161 
Big data is scary because it has begun to make rapid scientific 
methodological changes, although not likely in the direction Jevons 
suggested. In order to grapple with the complexity of systems big data 
methodology is taking a different shape. Big data provides answers 
without questions. No hypothesis is needed to test. “Historically, 
social scientists would plan an experiment, decide what data to collect, 
and analyze the data. Now the low costs of storage... have caused a 
 
 
 
 
160 HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE, supra note 59. 
161 WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE: A TREATISE ON LOGIC AND 
SCIENTIFIC METHOD 2:457-458 (1874). 
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rethinking, as people ‘collect everything and then search for 
significant patterns in the data.’”162 As data-mining matured and grew 
into analytics, it spread well beyond small computer science and 
computational sub-fields. Now, big data analytics can be used to mine 
incoming data in real-time to reveal correlations that may or may not 
be interesting or valuable. It is observational in a sense, but a 
departure from the concept of knowledge production which required 
significantly more upfront planning by the researcher.   
This collect-all, discover-later approach has been called data 
dredging, which runs the risk of returning statistical significance by 
chance. “Big Data enables the practice of apophenia: seeing patterns 
where none actually exist, simply because massive quantities of data 
can offer connections that radiate in all directions.”163 Nathan Eagle 
argues that “No matter how much data exists, researchers still need to 
ask the right questions to create a hypothesis, design a test, and use 
the data to determine whether that hypothesis is true.”164 This may be 
true in a few corners of health research, but even in the high stakes 
arena of health data, discoveries in drug interactions165 and 
genomics166 have already moved beyond the delineated process. The 
requisite Google Flu Trend reference may serve as a commercial 
example:  
Not only was ‘Google Flu Trends’ quick, accurate and 
cheap, it was theory-free. Google’s engineers didn’t 
bother to develop a hypothesis about what search terms 
– ‘flu symptoms’ or ‘pharmacies near me’ – might be 
correlated with the spread of the disease itself. The 
 
 
 
 
162 Shaw, supra note 30, at 34. 
163 boyd & Crawford, supra note 32, at 668. 
164 Shaw, supra note 30, at 34. 
165 John Markoff, “Unreported Side Effects of Drugs Are Found Using Internet Search 
Data, Study Finds,” N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 6 2013), available at  http:// www.nytimes. com / 
2013/ 03/07/science/unreported-side-effects-of-drugs-found-using-internet-data-study-
finds.html?_r=1&. 
166 “Big Data Genomics Sequencing,” Intel, http://www.intel.com/ content/www/us/ 
en/big-data/renci-peer-story.html. 
242 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 11:2 
 
Google team just took their top 50 million search terms 
and let the algorithms do the work.167 
From hypothesis-free to theory-free, the quote leads to the next 
structural change. 
 
3. Displacement of Theory 
 
Theory during the probabilistic revolution was full of tension 
between determinism and chance. The trend for those dealing with 
the numbers was to let “the facts” speak for themselves. The London 
Statistical Society’s motto was Aliis exterendum or “to be threshed out 
by others.” It refused to concern itself with cause or effect or chance or 
why.168 Quetelet’s approach required no knowledge of actual causes 
but only the identification of regularities and he renounced analysis.169 
A number of theories were articulated by champions of various camps, 
but slowly debates began to take shape around a few themes, such as 
the meaning of error, appropriate application of methods to particular 
problems, and the role of free will.  
Not entirely dissimilar to the conversations today about the 
quality, applicability, and responsibility of the use of big data 
analytics. In an incredibly controversial 2008 Wired article, Chris 
Anderson wrote,  
[The Petabyte Age] forces us to view data 
mathematically first and establish a context for it later. 
For instance, Google conquered the advertising world 
with nothing more than applied mathematics. It didn't 
pretend to know anything about the culture and 
conventions of advertising — it just assumed that better 
 
 
 
 
167 When the Center for Disease Control data slowly came in, Google’s prediction had 
overstated the severity of the outbreak by a factor of two. “The problem was that Google did 
not know – could not begin to know – what linked the search terms with the spread of flu. 
Google’s engineers weren’t trying to figure out what caused what.” Tim Hartford, “Big 
Data: Are We Making a Big Mistake?” FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014), available at 
http:// www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ 21a6e7d8-b479-11e3-a09a-00144feabdc0. html#axzz2xL1zS 
Uh9. Google Flu Trends is consistently used as an example of the power and potential of 
big data, but its appropriateness of such and accuracy has been questioned and scrutinized. 
See David Lazar, et al., The Parable of -Google Flu: Traps in Big Data Analysis, 343: 6176 
SCIENCE 1203-05 (Mar., 2013). 
168 GERD GIGERENZER, ET AL., supra note 70, at 37-40. 
169 Id., at 40-42. 
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data, with better analytical tools, would win the day. 
And Google was right... With enough data, the numbers 
speak for themselves. Petabytes allow us to say: 
‘Correlation is enough.’170  
danah boyd and Kate Crawford’s response is worth citing in full: 
Significantly, Anderson’s sweeping dismissal of all 
other theories and disciplines is a tell: it reveals an 
arrogant undercurrent in many Big Data debates where 
all other forms of analysis can be sidelined by 
production lines of numbers, privileged as having a 
direct line to raw knowledge. Why people do things, 
write things, or make things is erased by the sheer 
volume of numerical repetition and large patterns. This 
is not a space for reflection or the older forms of 
intellectual craft.171   
Not only does a big data-based mindset require a computational 
perspective that may limit the way the world is explored, it may also 
cut inquiry short. This is the claim of the end of theory: once a 
correlation has been discovered, the important work is done. “Hard 
sciences” use “theory” differently than other disciplines. A scientific 
theory is a hypothesis supported by repeated testing, which may 
eventually elevate to a law. In computer science theories represent 
problems to be solved like randomness, interaction, and non-
determinism. Theory beyond these realms is a system of ideas 
intended to explain some aspect of the world; theory comes first - data 
second. As computational turns are taken across society, theory may 
shift to mean something more closely aligned to hard science: data 
first - theory second.172  
The role theory will play in data-based knowledge is unclear, but 
its displacement has already occurred in a number of fields. For 
instance, an international relations symposium entitled “The ‘End of 
IR Theory?’” was held in November, 2013, where John J. 
 
 
 
 
170 Anderson, supra note 96. 
171 boyd & Crawford, supra note 32, at 666. 
172 This point is dangerously close to motivating a discussion about inductive versus 
deductive reasoning, which is beyond the scope of the article. Instead, I simply suggest that 
where the theoretical work is being done and who is doing it in the process is changing and, 
at least momentarily, theory may be disappearing. 
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Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt explain that theorists represent 
the fields most prestigious scholars and still, the discipline has moved 
away from theory toward efforts “devoted to collecting data and 
testing empirical propositions.”173 More conclusive is an analysis of 
27,000 internet studies social science articles published between 
2000 and 2009 that found less than a third referenced a single 
theoretical source.174 These examples suggest that theory is currently 
displaced by big data-based knowledge discovery and that this 
difference in kind signifies a shift. Understanding the world through 
datafication is a different process designed to produce a different form 
of knowledge allowing for governance of different parts of individuals 
and society. 
 
D. Differences 
 
Beyond the similarities associated with increased volume, speed, 
variety, connectivity, technical and statistical sophistication, and 
widespread application, there are probably numerous differences 
between these periods that are far more relevant to the conversation 
today than the difference between printed and digital numbers. One 
that is likely relevant is the fact that there appears to have been no 
market for printed numbers during the avalanche in the 1800s. There 
were examples of exclusionary measures taken to keep others from 
data, but no indication of a market or small scale sales. Relatedly, 
money was not represented or traded using data, so security threats 
do not appear to have been an issue. Reidentification does not appear 
to have been a recognized threat – there was likely neither the 
incentive to reidentify nor the technical or time resources to make it a 
worthwhile endeavor. These may be couched as proprietary and 
security issues, which will not be addressed further in any depth, but 
point to the continued applicability of industrialization as a frame of 
reference.  
Additionally, much of the work published on the meaning and 
appropriateness of probabilistic approaches were placed in philosophy 
journals or by men trained in philosophy, if not wholly labeled as 
 
 
 
 
173 Daniel Nexon, “Symposium – Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis 
Testing is Bad for IR,” THE DUCK OF MINERVA (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www. 
whiteoliphaunt.com /duckofminerva/ 2013/09/leaving-theory-behind-why-simplistic-
hypothesis-testing-is-bad-for-ir.html. 
174 Tai-Quan Peng, et al., Mapping the Landscape of Internet Studies: Text Mining of 
Social Science Journal Articles 2000-2009, 15:5 NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY 644-664 (2012). 
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philosophers – who were also practitioners. Others like Comte, 
rejected these methods and argued against their incorporation into 
their disciplines. Today expertise is more heavily divided. Cutting edge 
data scientists are rarely aware of or arguing the finer points of human 
autonomy, dignity, or larger social ramifications of datafication. The 
political climate for reform was strong in Europe over this period, 
most notably in the United Kingdom, which can be distinguished in 
many ways from today, but civic unrest certainly permeates modern 
times, mostly notably since the financial crisis of 2008. Turning back 
to the similarities shared by the avalanche of numbers and big data, 
the following section addresses the question of just how revolutionary 
big data may be and what this revolutionary future means for data 
protection. 
IV. BIG DATA REVOLUTION(S) 
“Probability is the most important concept in modern science, 
especially as nobody has the slightest notion what it means.” 
- Bertrand Russell, 1929 lecture175 
 
“Big data is like teenage sex: everyone talks about it, nobody really 
knows how to do it, everyone thinks everyone else is doing it, so 
everyone claims they are doing it...” 
- Dan Ariely, 2013 Facebook post176 
 
Again, the comparative exercise is not intended to suggest that big 
data and the avalanche of numbers are the same, but that big data is 
new in a way that is similar to the way the avalanche of numbers was 
new.177 Determining the type of newness presented by big data is 
important to its governance, and any other type of emerging socio-
technical issue. The probabilistic revolution that took place from 
1800-1930 was pressed forward with the avalanche of numbers from 
the 1820s to 1840s, but it is not considered a “scientific revolution” 
under prominent criteria. In this section, I compare the probabilistic 
 
 
 
 
175 Quoted in STANLEY SMITH STEVENS, HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 44 
(1951). 
176 Dan Ariely, Facebook (Jan. 6, 2013), https://www.facebook.com/ 
dan.ariely/posts/904383595868. 
177 Tom Standage similarly ties the telegraph to the internet in THE VICTORIAN INTERNET: 
THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY’S ON-LINE 
PIONEERS (1989). 
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revolution to the early evidence of a big data transition so as to better 
understand its disruptive nature in historical context against markers 
that serve to signify scientific revolution. 
 
 A. The Revolutionary Status of Probability  
 
In 1962, Thomas S. Kuhn published his landmark text, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in which he argued that periods of 
“normal science” were disrupted by episodes of “revolutionary 
science.” Normal science is cumulative. It is business as usual. Key 
theories, metaphysics, tools, and values are fixed and research 
generates puzzle-solutions.178 Novel, anomalous puzzles that cannot 
be tackled effectively by normal science incite revolution within the 
community. When confidence in normal science to solve these 
anomalies is lost, a crisis arises. During this pre-paradigm phase of 
crisis, research is carried out in a scientific nature, but methodology, 
terminology, and types of experimentation are all diverse, innovative, 
and unorganized without a clear understanding of which are likely to 
contribute insight relevant to the future. There is little consensus 
around a particular theory; science is pursued under incomplete, 
incompatible, and theory-disputed design.  
Crisis is followed by resolution and the forming of new paradigms 
of normal science. Paradigms can be understood as consensus – the 
chaotic revolutionary science that is produced post-normal science179 
matures and paradigms develop as research traditions and conceptual 
frameworks begin to form out of the disparate and unorganized 
intellectual energy. The community is converted to the new paradigm 
based on its promise for future research, its ability to resolve gaps the 
old paradigm could not fill, and a novel aesthetic (these converts are 
often very young or new to the field).180  New paradigms not only 
reinterpret old data in new ways, but ask new questions of old data.181 
 
 
 
 
178 Kuhn, supra note 9, at 35-41. 
179 Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Revetz coined the term Post-Normal Science in the 1980s 
to describe new approaches to “wicked problems,” characterized by uncertain facts, 
disputed values, high stakes, and urgent political decisions. Funtowicz & Revetz, supra 
note 12, at 253. These are post-normal problems for post-normal science as opposed to 
normal problems presented by normal science. The term “post-normal” is intended to 
address the period of transition between normal sciences. For a discussion on the various 
ways “post-normal science” has been used and expanded upon see John Turnpenny, Mavis 
Jones, & Irene Lorenzoni, supra note 12, at 287-306. 
180 Kuhn, supra note 9, at 165. 
2015] AMBROSE 247 
 
They move beyond the puzzle solving of the old paradigm,182 change 
the rules of the research game,183 and redirect the “map” of new 
research.184 
The probabilistic revolution is not considered revolutionary under 
these criteria.185 No single anomalous event threw the scientific world 
into upheaval. No single individual or group can claim credit. It did 
not develop within a single science to deal with a particular problem 
that required major theoretical alterations. Instead, it stems from and 
affects a wide range of fields, with a number of piecemeal 
contributors, and the new methods that developed seem to be a 
product of external social force, as opposed to internal specific 
problem solving.186 Most importantly, the probabilistic revolution was 
slow, taking the better part of a century to attain and settle into its 
paradigmatic state.187 
Ian Hacking refers to the probabilistic revolution as an 
“emergence.”188 It shared some of the same phases as scientific 
revolutions. Theories, methods, and possibilities were shaken up, but 
very slowly hashed out as the probabilistic paradigm took shape. 
Hacking explains, “The emergence of probability, however, was a 
change more fundamental than any revolution. A new thinking 
cap.”189 This cap is the result of slow, steady progress made through 
the development of practices surrounding data across a wide range of 
fields and contexts and decades-long debates about what those 
developments meant. 
                                                                                                                   
181 Id., at 121, 139, 159. 
182 Id., at 36-42, 144. 
183 Id., at 40-41, 175. 
184 Id., at 109-111. 
185 HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY, supra note 91, at Introduction 2006: 
Archeology of Probable Reasoning; Hacking, Was There a Probabilistic Revolution 1800-
1930?, supra note 94. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY, supra note 91, at Introduction 2006: The 
Archeology of Probable Reasoning. 
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B. Revolutionary State of Second Wave Big Data 
The second wave of big data similarly resembles the beginning of 
an emergence, as opposed to a revolution. Like the probabilistic 
revolution, it is missing a key player or group that discovered an 
anomaly that requires a complete overhaul of understanding in a field. 
Nonetheless, the post-normal (the pre-paradigm/crisis phase) 
characteristics of value disputes, multiple perspectives, and 
methodological experimentation appear to be underway.190  
Enthusiasm surrounding big data has spread to all corners and fields.  
Value disputes about big data range from privacy concerns to the 
value of knowledge data practices produce and span across fields, 
industries, government agencies, communities, and individuals. Each 
assesses and takes on big data in a different way. The wide reaching 
enthusiasm relate to the problems that can be solved and answers that 
can be found using “new science.” Old data is being reinterpreted and 
new questions asked of it.191  
The extraordinary leaps made in experiment design that 
developed over the course of the probabilistic revolution were still 
situated in what we now understand as the classic scientific method, 
where “[o]bservation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a 
definite task, a point of view, a problem.”192 Jim Gray argued that this 
was part of the second paradigm. The first paradigm was a “thousand 
years ago and involved describing natural phenomena (empirical). 
The second from the “last few hundred years” used models and 
generalization (theoretical). The third occurred over the “last few 
decades” and involved simulating complex phenomena 
(computational). These have culminated in the fourth paradigm, 
which Gray describes as data exploration (or eScience): 
“Originally, there was just experimental science, and 
then there was theoretical science, with Kepler’s Laws, 
Newton’s Laws of Motion, Maxwell’s equations, and so 
on. Then for many problems, the theoretical models 
grew too complicated to solve analytically, and people 
 
 
 
 
190 FUNTOWICZ & REVETZ, supra note 12; TURNPENNY, JONES, & LORENZONI, supra note 12. 
191 See e.g., Michel Jean-Baptiste, et al., Quantitative Analysis of  Culture Using Millions of 
Digitized Books, 331: 6014 SCI. 176-182 (Jan. 2011); Rosenberg, supra note 21 (discussing 
the use of google book analytics to understand the history of the word ‘data.’). 
192 HUGH G. GAUCH JR., SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN BRIEF 57 (2012). 
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had to start simulating. These simulations have carried 
us through much of the last half of the last millennium. 
At this point, the simulations are generating a whole lot 
of data, along with a huge increase in data from the 
experimental sciences.”193 
Gray spoke of the fourth paradigm in traditional sciences as one 
marked by the combination of computational and informatics 
subdisciplines, but the combination of simulation and experimental 
data is only one of numerous combinations that are available for 
scientists, whom he explains see the data stores only much later in the 
discovery process.194 The structural changes to inquiry – the division 
of data labor, methodological disruption, and the displacement of 
theory – all suggest that this is a moment of transition - a post-
normal, pre-paradigmatic, crisis state of emergence, which do not 
necessarily take on a new shape quickly.   
This fourth paradigm extends well beyond scientific discovery. 
Leading information ethicist Luciano Floridi’s recent book The Fourth 
Revolution195 echoes award winning historian Bruce Mazlish’s 1993 
The Fourth Discontinuity.196 Both argue that we once understood 
humans as something special but that Nicholas Copernicus’s theory 
dislodged us from the center of the universe, Darwin placed us on an 
evolutionary chain with the rest of life on Earth, and Freud Both argue 
that we again are having an identity crisis, trying to understand 
ourselves as distinct and special in the Digital Age. Floridi discusses 
humans in relation to information and Mazlish in relation to 
machines. The previous three phases took decades of debate and 
experimentation to resolve and have been embraced in various ways 
across fields and cultures. The fourth paradigm, revolution, and 
discontinuity all rely on big data and will represent important aspects 
of the second wave of big data emergence. For the purposes of 
governance or policy, the relevant difference is a prolonged state of 
 
 
 
 
193 HEY, TANSLEY, & TOLLE, supra note 123, at xvii. 
194 Id. 
195 LUCIANO FLORIDI, THE FOURTH REVOLUTION: HOW THE INFOSPHERE IS RESHAPING 
REALITY (2014). 
196 BRUCE MAZLISH, THE FOURTH DISCONTINUITY: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF HUMANS AND 
MACHINES (1993). 
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uncertainty about where we are headed, if anywhere – what is the new 
thinking cap?197 
 
C. Other Futures 
 
 Of course a single set of events is not enough data to make a sound 
prediction.198 Sketching a picture of the past is a futile exercise in 
many ways, and perhaps the overlooked differences make the 
comparison a fruitless one. Alternatively, there may have been other 
waves of technical advancement, followed by a wave of big data that 
resulted in no epistemic change.199  
Perhaps nothing will come of the second wave of big data. Perhaps 
the similarities to the probabilistic revolution are too similar – this is 
an extension of the exact same process. The difference may only be 
digital, and therefore bigger, faster, and stronger, but will not yield a 
new understanding the world. Maybe the big data predictions we are 
working within today are simply a more sophisticated and saturated 
version of the probabilities from two hundred years ago. This is 
essentially Krishan Kumar’s argument from 1995, in which he states, 
“The information society theorists can be attacked, firstly, for their 
short-sighted historical perspective… What seem to them novel and 
current can be shown to have been in the making for the past hundred 
years.”200 Kumar argues that the information society is simply a 
 
 
 
 
197 Hesitant to make any predictions about what kind of epistemic revolution may be 
approaching, it will necessarily be tied to computation, just as probability was tied to 
industrialization. I have found the most likely sources in machine learning. Tentatively I 
presume we will continue to be challenged by algorithmic living and its impact on society, 
but also our reliance on rules versus rationality and reason. For what I consider 
foreshadowing of some of the epistemic shifts in the computer age see PAUL ERICKSON, 
JUDY L. KLEIN, LORRAIN J. DASTON, REBECCA LEMOV, THOMAS STURM, AND MICHAEL D. 
GORDIN, HOW REASON ALMOST LOST ITS MIND: THE STRANGE CAREER OF COLD WAR 
RATIONALITY (2013). 
198 See supra note 17, for value of focusing on a single case. 
199 A potential place to look, although I have found nothing definitive or examples that 
extend big data beyond specific populations, are histories or the historizing of information 
overload. Daniel Rosenberg, Early Modern Information Overload, 64 J. HIST. IDEAS 1-9 
(Jan. 2003), wherein the author discusses the scholarly publications that produced 
information overload throughout 1550 to 1750 and descriptions and measurements of the 
natural world that flooded scientists between 1550 and 1620.  
200 Krishan Kumar, From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society, in THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 109 (Frank Webster ed., 1995) (To that end, the “information society” “has not 
produced a radical shift in the way industrial societies are organized, or in the direction in 
which they have been moving. The imperatives of profit, power, and control seem as 
predominant now as they have ever been in the history of capitalistic industrialism. The 
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continuation of the industrial revolution.201 Similarly, James Beniger 
argued in 1989 that the information society is an outgrowth of the 
control revolution that began in the 19th century, and that 
information technology will just be applied at higher levels of 
control.202    
Perhaps we are all just computers. Big data may prove that, in fact, 
if everything is datafied, we are all just 1s and 0s governed by 
algorithms and the universe is one big computer. This would be quite 
an epistemic shift but essentially takes us back to determinism and so, 
not precisely an epistemic emergence. Disproving such notions has 
brought forth extraordinary gains in understanding our tools, 
innovations, and methods for interpreting and acting upon the world, 
as the debates and developments during the probabilistic revolution 
represent. In any case, everyone, including policy-makers, appears to 
be inclined to find out what big data is exactly and can do. So now, I 
turn to the data protection challenges such uncertainty presents. 
V. DATA PROTECTION CHALLENGES  
In some ways, it would be preferable, from a policy perspective, if 
big data were a revolution. Although a particular science would be in 
upheaval, at least there would be some central point to shift around. 
Emergence is slow, unintentional, uncertain, and widespread. The 
question for big data may not be how the law can balance benefits and 
                                                                                                                   
difference lies in the greater range and intensity of their applications… not in any change in 
the principles themselves.” Id., at 154). 
201 Kumar argued that the US is still an industrial society because it engages in the 
production and export of ideas and knowledge and that “In so far as Taylorism remains the 
master principle, information technology has a greater potential for proletarianization than 
for professionalization.” Id., at 112. 
202 JAMES BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION 434 (1986). These arguments hinge on the 
machines and computers being understood the same way by those that apply them to 
humans and society. If we can all be broken down into discrete mechanical moving parts, 
we can be integrated into factory automation. But if we can all be broken down into 
discrete bits and algorithms, is there a difference? If not, Kumar is likely right and we are 
simply moving toward an increasing control world, but I believe the adaptability of 
computers (and humans) marks this as a (innovation-information-epistemic) cycle begun 
anew that may lead to a similarly momentous shift in understanding. In the 1800s we 
learned the many ways in humans are not machines and the world is not deterministic. I 
believe a pursuit that investigates the way in which humans are or are not computers could 
reveal an entirely new insight. 
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harms,203 but what role law should play during times of emergence.204 
Too little is known at this point about the role of law in the emergence 
of probabilistic thought (as well as scientific revolutions in general). 
We are flying blind in two senses: we do not know enough about the 
role of law during different kinds of progress, revolution, evolution, or 
emergence, and we do not know what kind of understanding of the 
world may develop, if any, as the intellectual pursuits spurred by big 
data shake out and find footing. I turn now to the roles of law in 
emergence in order to better tailor difficult big data questions moving 
forward in light of reflections on the avalanche of numbers. 
 
A. Law as Regulator  
 
The Fair Information Practices Principles (FIPPs) have governed 
information use through its collection to disposal for decades. These 
principles have been in place since the 1970s, when they were 
originally crafted by a Health, Education, and Welfare advisory 
committee in response to growing concern about the use of data banks 
and systems holding and processing personal information.205 Other 
committees, like the Committee on Privacy in Great Britain, were 
considering the same concerns and over the next decade FIPPs 
evolved and was incorporated into a number of data protection 
 
 
 
 
203 Jules Polonetsky and Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data Making Ends Meet; Big Data 
for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 25 
(2013).  
204 While I argue that the changing nature of inquiry is a strong justification for revisiting 
data protection policy in this section, it is important to note even differences in degree 
related to size, speed, and variety have strained basic concepts of data protection, like 
control. Sam Pfeifle, “Keynote: Forget Notice and Choice, Let’s Regulate Use,” IAPP 
PRIVACY ADVISOR (Dec. 12, 2013) at https://www.privacyassociation.org/ publications/ 
keynote_forget_notice_and_choice_lets_regulate_use. Control of one’s information has 
served as a tenant of privacy until recently. Doubts surround privacy protections that rely 
on users to control their own information when there is so much, in so many places, being 
used for so many reasons, with so many potentials. The sheer number of different users 
also puts a strain on existing information protections where identification and enforcement 
of abuse are challenging. Total information awareness that leaves no room for emergent 
subjective, or the free spaces that protect the dynamic self’s ability to develop and change, 
is another difference in degree worthy of motivating serious reflection on existing data 
laws. JULIE COHEN, RECONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012). However, the 
differences in big data-based inquiry are also compelling justifications for retooling 
existing information policy for one main reason: the existing information policy (FIPPs) 
prescribes a process and the big data differences in kind are structural and methodological. 
205 COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1992).  
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regimes, including the Privacy Act of 1974 in the US, the Council of 
Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal data, and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. FIPPs 
have been embraced by nearly every information policy, law, and 
regulation in one form or another. While the principles take numerous 
forms, I will use the OECD guidelines:206 
 
Collection Limitation Principle: There should be limits to the 
collection of personal data and any such data should be 
obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, 
with the knowledge or consent of the data subject. 
 
Data Quality Principle: Personal data should be relevant to 
the purposes for which they are to be used and, to the extent 
necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete, 
and kept up-to-date. 
 
Purpose Specification Principle: The purposes for which 
personal data are collected should be specified not later than 
at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited 
to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not 
incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on 
each occasion of change of purpose. 
 
Use Limitation Principle: Personal data should not be 
disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes 
other than those specified in accordance with the Purpose 
Specification Principle except: a) with the consent of the data 
subject; or b) by the authority of law. 
 
Security Safeguards Principle: Personal data should be 
protected by reasonable security safeguards against such 
risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, 
modification or disclosure of data. 
 
Openness Principle: There should be a general policy of 
openness about developments, practices and policies with 
 
 
 
 
206 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF 
PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980). 
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respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of 
establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and 
the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and 
usual residence of the data controller. 
 
Individual Participation Principle: An individual should have 
the right: a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, 
confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data 
relating to him; b) to have communicated to him, data 
relating to him within a reasonable time; at a charge, if any, 
that is not excessive; in a reasonable manner; and in a form 
that is readily intelligible to him; c) to be given reasons if a 
request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and 
to be able to challenge such denial; and d) to challenge data 
relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the 
data erased, rectified, completed or amended. 
 
Accountability Principle: A data controller should be 
accountable for complying with measures, which give effect 
to the principles stated above. 
 
Big data practices have challenged these principles and caused 
many to call for the discontinuation or adjustment of FIPPs. 
Rationales for redrafting FIPPs usually involve the inefficiencies and 
difficulties in applying the principles and/or the benefits that are 
prevented by the application of the principles.   
Rationales for revamping FIPPs often point to the principles that 
do not seem to represent the way big data analytics (and the data-
based world they have emerged from) are being performed, and argue 
that applying the principles is inefficient. Notice and consent have 
become incredibly problematic,207 which throws off data protection 
that relies on user control and participation.208 These problems filter 
down through the other principles. The two principles most related to 
 
 
 
 
207 Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1888-93 (2013) (“The point is that it is virtually impossible for a 
person to make meaningful judgments about the costs and benefits of revealing certain 
data.”); Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 341 (Jane K. Winn ed.,2006). 
208 Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality: A Survey, in PRIVACY 
AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 15, 16 (Katherine 
R. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and 
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1661 (1999). 
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big data processes are purpose specificity and use limitations.209 Big 
data practices do not begin with data collected to be tested for a 
specific purpose but the aggregation of incongruent data to discover 
correlations that would otherwise go unnoticed. The use limitation is 
similarly problematic, because big data practices rely on the reuse and 
sharing of data to move data into new contexts and to understand how 
things change over time. It is argued that in order to maintain big 
data’s three V’s, FIPPs should be retooled so that data can remain 
voluminous (e.g., do not delete after specified use), fast (e.g., do not 
revisit user to get consent for new use or context), and various (e.g., 
share data with other partners not realized during collection). Even 
the data quality principle is problematic to big data, “with its 
emphasis on comprehensive datasets and messiness, [which] helps us 
get closer to reality than did our dependence on small data and 
accuracy.”210  
The related rationale is that these principles should be efficient 
for data practices because those data practices result in profound 
social benefits. Examples of the benefits range from medical advances 
to national security. These benefits often have immediate results. 
Cukier and Mayer-Schönberger cite to the way in which analytics are 
used to monitor and treat premature babies.211 Analytics have also 
shed light on nudging individuals to vote, traveling patterns in urban 
areas, the impact of good teachers,212 managing drought,213 and 
identifying crimes and criminals.214 With these benefits, many are 
inspired to reconsider FIPPs or other data protection regimes that 
would infringe on reaping and further developing these benefits.  
 
 
 
 
209 Fred H. Cate, Peter Cullen and Vikter Mayer-Schonberger, “Data Protection Principles 
for the 21st Century: Revising the 1980 OECD Guidelines,” Oxford Internet Institute 
Report (March 2014); “Big Data and Analytics: Seeking Foundations for Effective Privacy 
Guidance, Centre for Information Policy Leadership Discussion Report (Feb. 2013). 
210 CUKIER & MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 3, at 48. 
211 Id., at 60.  
212 Erez Aiden & Jean-Baptiste Michel, “The Predictive Power of Big Data,” NEWSWEEK 
(Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/predictive-power-big-data-225125. 
213 Marcus Wohlsen, “Big Data Helps Farmers Weather Drought’s Damage,” WIRED (Sept. 
6, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/09/big-data-drought/. 
214 Mark Ward, “Crime Fighting with Big Data Weapons,” BBC (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26520013. 
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While these rationales are certainly worthy of consideration, they 
essentially relegate the law to weighing pros and cons. This has been a 
consistent theme in big data legal scholarship: the law must figure out 
how to balance the benefits with the harms.215 The White House Big 
Data Report, released in May 2014, states, “Perhaps most important of 
all, a shift to focus on responsible uses in the big data context allows 
us to put our attention more squarely on the hard questions we must 
reckon with: how to balance the socially beneficial uses of big data 
with the harms to privacy and other values that can result in a world 
where more data is inevitably collected about more things.”216 As the 
above sections argue, the benefits of big data are uncertain.217 Some 
projects provide seemingly beneficial results, but the overall benefits 
of big data are hard to predict. The harms are equally hard to predict, 
even when the assessment is restricted to a single project.  
FIPPs intends to protect values in an increasingly automated 
world by prescribing a series of practices. By requiring a specified 
purpose, collection based on that purpose, and the destruction of data 
once the purpose has been met, FIPPs prescribes a way in which data 
practices must be performed. Risk-based accountability approaches 
have been proposed in the wake of FIPPs criticisms.218 A risk-based 
approach increasingly allows data controllers and users to assess the 
risk the use poses to the data subject.219 These efforts do not prescribe 
any particular process of inquiry, but have been criticized because 
 
 
 
 
215 See supra note 6. 
216 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 151. 
217 Paul Ohm, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 339 (2013). 
218 Stuart S. Shapiro, “The Risk of the ‘Risk-Based Approach,’” IAPP PRIVACY PERSPECTIVES 
(Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.privacyassociation.org/ privacy_perspectives/post/ 
the_risk_of_the_risk_based_approach (referring to a risk-based approach to privacy as 
the new black and accountability as less chic).  
219 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and 
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L. J. 377, 386-87 (2006). 
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they infringe the basic rights of individuals220 and identifying risks 
under particular types of uncertainty is incredibly challenging.221 
As those who have expressed concern about the applicability of 
FIPPs to performing big data practices suggest, the more pressing 
rationale is a movement away from the process FIPPs prescribes. The 
challenge for updating data protection so that it no longer adheres to 
an outdated process is that there is no new process in place to shift to 
– what will come of big data methods, practices, structures, theories is 
still unfolding. It is a moving target and any epistemic revolutions on 
the horizon are still unclear. 
To continue to rely on the current version of FIPPs and the process 
it embodies effectively prohibits practices in post-normal big data 
science. To ignore the process set forth by FIPPs is to legitimize 
certain big data practices and potential, notably the high saturation of 
automated, data-based decision-making. Neither is unheard of. The 
departure from normal methods is not without its critics – it wouldn’t 
be post-normal science without critics. On the contrary, the barrage of 
methodology, displacement of theory, and shifts in data labor that 
have come along with big data has provoked responses that range 
from hesitation to warnings to condemnation, and are discussed 
throughout Section II and III. Whether big data analytics and various 
immature approaches associated with it are short-sighted is one 
question. Whether they should be prohibited is another. Certainly 
history provides examples of swift legal responses to scientific inquiry 
that ranged from inhumane222 to simply more harmful than 
beneficial,223 as well as the research with the potential to know more 
 
 
 
 
220 Ann Cavoukian, “More Privacy Paternalism: ‘We Know What’s Best for You,’” IAPP 
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about people than is socially beneficial.224 If the nature of inquiry 
blossoming in the data-based paradigm is to be discontinued due to 
individual and social harms, action should be taken to prevent its 
growth. If not, data protection must be revisited because it currently 
leaves data subjects exposed to great risks.225  
 
B. Law as Legitimizer 
 
Although the law will find balancing benefits and harms difficult 
with such uncertain developments, it will also find its role as 
legimitizer challenging. “One key role of the legal order in society, a 
role backed up by force if necessary, is to keep society on an even keel, 
to preserve it more or less as it is, and so far as change is concerned, to 
guarantee that change occurs in orderly and regular ways, in ways that 
society approves.”226 Based on the unique ways in which methods 
spread and advanced during the probabilistic revolution, the law holds 
an interesting role in big data development. In the nineteenth century 
big data practices were legitimized by being driven by government 
initiatives and collaborations, utilized by various agencies, but were 
also unrecognized when insufficient or unclear – well before 
probability had settled into what we understand it today. 
Of course the census is a form of policy legitimizing the use of data 
to administer resources to alter the population, but the modern 
Western census was first conducted in Canada in 1666 to combat the 
threat of under-population and defense in the face of English 
colonialism.227 The United States of America, named by statistician 
Richard Price, conducted its first constitutionally imposed census in 
1790, but it was considered inaccurate and poorly administered. 
During the avalanche of numbers, census questions presented in the 
census grew rapidly, but the avalanche did not fall in the U.S. between 
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(discussing prohibitions on DNA research in the 1970s). 
225 Paul Ohm, Changing the Rules: General Principles for Data Use and Analysis, in 
PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 96 (Julia Lane, 
Victoria Stodden, Stefan Bender, Helen Nissenbaum eds., 2014). 
226 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS 2 (2007). 
227 Hacking, Biopower and The Avalanche of Printed Numbers, supra note 28, at 289. 
2015] AMBROSE 259 
 
1820 and 1840. The 1790 census only asked six questions228 and not 
much changed until 1870, “[b]ut once the American bureaucrats 
caught on, they typically made ‘avalanche of numbers’ a mild 
understatement.”229 In 1870, 156 questions, then 13,010 in 1880, and 
in 1890 only a few more were asked, but they were calculated using 
Herman Hollerith’s tabulation machine.230  
Prior to the increase of questions, U.S. citizens were fined for non-
compliance, communities were involved in shaming members into 
participation through public posting of returns, and marshals were 
fined if they did not meet their quotas.231 Not only did the new 
enthusiasm for the census represent a form of legitimizing datafied 
governance, it was also associated with an important understanding 
regarding participation – confidentiality. The Census Office had a 
general policy abolishing public postings beginning in 1850 that 
stated, “No graver offense can be committed by Assistant Marshals 
than to divulge information acquired in the discharge of their duty. All 
disclosures should be treated as strictly confidential . . . . The 
Department is determined to protect the citizen in all his rights in the 
present Census.”232 But there were no penalties for doing so. Finally, 
at the behest of Representative James A. Garfield who explained 
“[t]he citizen is not adequately protected from the danger, or rather 
the apprehension, that his private affairs, the secrets of his family and 
his business, will be disclosed to his neighbors,”233 Congress 
criminalized disclosure in 1890.234 Trust, not pressure or coercion, 
appears to be an important aspect of legitimizing data practice. 
 
 
 
 
228 The questions were: (1) name of head of family, (2) number of free white males over 
sixteen, (3) number of free white males under 16, (4) number of free white females, (5) 
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155-156 (2005). 
232 Id., at 156. 
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Courtrooms were original spaces for investigation by the 
probabilists. Louis Poinsot considered Poisson’s 1835 application of 
probability to judicial statistics a “false application of mathematical 
science… This singular idea of a calculus applicable to things where 
the ignorance and passion of men are intermingled in an imperfect 
light is dangerously illusive in several sense.”235 And later that “the 
application of this calculus to matters of morality is repugnant to the 
soul. It amounts, for example, to representing the truth of a verdict by 
a number, to thus treat men as if they were dice, each with many 
faces, some for error, some for truth.”236 Poisson, like Laplace and 
Nicolas de Condorcet before him, sought to optimally design a jury or 
tribunal so that the probability of an erroneous decision was 
minimized.237  
A probabilistic degree of certainty was also apportioned to the 
probative weight of different types of evidence.238 A probability for 
judging correctly was calculated for each decider, whose minds, if they 
were good minds, calculated and compared probabilities based on the 
regularity and frequency of experienced events.239 Although 
probability theory’s late eighteenth century and early nineteenth 
century goal to model reasonableness had tied it tightly psychology 
and law, it became instead affixed to habit, bias, self-interest, and 
ignorance rather than mental calculus over the next decades. “The 
story of the ill-fated probability of judgments might serve as an object 
lesson in the need to exercise caution in the choice of a suitable set of 
phenomena to mathematize. The ‘good sense’ of reasonable men 
turned out to be notoriously unstable, as probabilists bent on 
mathematically describing it discovered to their chagrin.”240 These 
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ideas were motivated by an urgent interest in judicial reform, possible 
by the release of judicial statistics in the early nineteenth century, and 
conceptualized within existing notions of probabilities. The instability 
and criticism of these efforts likely influenced or at least stalled their 
incorporation into the courtroom. Although modeling and calculating 
the perfect trial faded as new conceptions of probability developed, 
the reasonable man remains a prominent fixture in legal systems.  
The reasonable man was likely born in the nineteenth century, a 
period fixated and wrestled with averages, although is birth is heavily 
debated. The 1837 landmark case of Vaughan v. Menlove marks an 
early, if not original, moment in which the reasonable man took center 
stage in the law of negligence.241 Menlove had been warned that his 
hay rack was dangerous and when it caught fire and destroyed a 
neighbor’s building he was sued. Probability theory was in the 
eighteenth century “a formal description of the intuitions of a 
prototypical reasonable man, and as a prescription for the rest of us,” 
meaning probability would model the minds of elite men who must be 
reasonable. This study of the rational individual faded when 
probability theory and statistics became the study of the irrationality 
of the masses. And so when Menlove argued in 1837 that he was not 
very intelligent and should be judged by a personal best effort 
standard, the court rejected it for an objective reasonableness 
standard, which “eliminates the personal equation and is independent 
of the idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is in 
question.”242 Early in the twentieth century Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 
theory of tort liability reflects an American version of Quetelet’s 
average man: 
The “reasonable man” knows, because “experience” 
tells him that a given behavior in a given 
circumstance—say, taking target practice in a 
populated area—carries the risk of injuring another 
person. Of course, any action in any circumstance 
carries some risk, however remote, of injuring another 
person; and reasonable people know this. But this 
knowledge is not what reasonableness consists in. 
What reasonableness consists in is the knowledge of 
the greater or lesser probability of an injury caused by 
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such and such an action in such and such 
circumstances. “[E]ven in the domain of knowledge,” 
as Holmes put it, “the law applies its principle of 
averages.”243 
The history of the development of fault, risk, and reasonableness is 
disputed, but the reasonable man is a confusing fixture in law. Judges 
have poetically described this ordinary everyman as one on the 
Clapman omnibus or his lawn mower wearing shirt sleeves,244 while 
scholars have mockingly endowed him with extraordinary abilities.245 
Even though the law, not the individual, sets the standard for 
negligent actions, big data may provide new tools and thinking about 
negligence, in which case the law will have to consider whether to 
embrace or reject big data. 
Larger conversations regarding social responsibility and human 
rights consumed many of these visionaries. Free will debates occupied 
the writers of England, who responded to Henry Thomas Buckle’s use 
of Quetelet’s work to dismiss the notion of free will.246 Fitzjames 
Stephen argued that statistical regularlity was an insufficient basis for 
conlcusions regarding human behavior and Robert Campbell chipped 
away at the rigor of Buckle’s work revealing instability.247 Although 
social and administrative statistics were strong in France, the French 
were leading opponents of statistics, with thinkers like Charles 
Bernard Renouvier who defended indeterminism, meaning that 
human freedom and free individual choices caused history, not vice 
versa.248 The Germans offered the most heated and insightful debate 
on the subject.249 Economist Adolph Wagner’s round about support of 
Buckle’s work, which was delivered in the form of a parable about 
social tendencies that great rulers could predict and expect but no 
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individual or state could oppose, drove its contestation in Germany.250 
Although Wagner did not deny free will, his work sparked responses 
on the subject from other commenters who critiqued statistics of 
society in relation to the individuals within it.251 To German thinkers, 
it was unacceptable to understand society as a mere sum of 
individuals. The French social physics and British economic liberalism 
were considered reductionistic and mechanic compared to the 
German holistic view of society, made up of varying autonomous 
individuals capable of acting in self-interest as well as to serve the 
larger social entity.252 German statistical innovation was inspired by 
the free will debate and the possibility of meaningful reform. For 
instance, Wilhelm Lexis showed in 1879 that organized labor workers 
could compel an increase in wages even in the face of the English 
economic natural laws (e.g., David Ricardo’s “iron law,” which stated 
that wages could never rise above subsistence). These ideas have 
shaped and been embraced by liberal and socialist national policies 
creating entire identities for nations and regions. Moral responsibility, 
causality, and reasonableness are the things of law and they were 
central to developments in the probabilistic revolution. 
The tumultuous development of consensus that follows the 
disruption of normal science (post-normal science) may work toward 
resolving uncertainty, complexity, and high stakes. Pressing policy 
choices extends far beyond the conventional use of the word 
‘science.’253 Co-production of science254 by joint efforts of decision-
makers, regulators, experts and the public is encouraged during post-
normal transitions.255 As methodological and epistemological debates 
that grew out of a very culturally entrenched scientific shift during the 
probabilistic revolution, the law was more fully entrenched in 
emergent developments than in scientific revolutions, which are 
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notable as more isolated scientific discoveries. For instance, free will 
played an integral part in the rise of probabilistic thinking, because 
determinism made no room for free will.256 Similarly, if the law were 
to champion autonomy in an algorithmically operated world, would 
the law prevent us from realizing we are just machines or help guide 
us through a difficult deterministic phase of knowing? The law will not 
only place a role in develops surrounding big data and any impending 
emergence by legitimizing certain practices, processes, data labor 
structures, and theories as well as actively drawing lines and creating 
regulating boundaries within big data practices. As a social construct, 
law cannot be or remain isolated from epistemic shifts.  
Today, the government’s use of big data (e.g., for parole release257), 
funding of big data (e.g., National Science Foundation grant for 
Foundations of Data and Visual Analytics258), and contributing to big 
data (e.g., open government initiatives259) are all ways in which the 
law passively legitimizes an epistemic shift and certain related 
practices. Its hesitation to incorporate big data practices into 
education or convictions is an important kind of restraint. As these 
numerous forms and functions of big data mature, the law will play an 
important role in its direction. This role should be recognized and 
taken on with intention and reflection.   
Far from a position of watching a technologically deterministic 
movement from the cheap seats, the law is vital to the development of 
and progress through any oncoming emergence. The role of 
legitimizer of epistemic shifts and practices is just one. The law’s more 
comfortable charge, as regulator of particular initiatives and goals as 
well as safeguard of values throughout this transition are discussed 
next. 
 
C. Law as Defender 
 
Assuming that big data inquiry will not be prohibited by the 
application of FIPPs and the law takes a reflective approach to the way 
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in which it legitimizes big data practices, I turn to the challenges of 
adapting data protection that defends basic values to big data 
practices in transition. When normal science is disrupted, whether 
from an anomalous event or a slow emergence, accompanying 
safeguards may need to be questioned, sought, and established to 
prevent manipulation and abuse, over reliance on a particular, limited 
type of knowledge, and unfair and unwanted impacts of classification 
and prediction. FIPPs have articulated these choices and safeguards. 
But, as the previous section discusses, FIPPs protect these values by 
prescribing a particular process of inquiry, one that current data-
based discovery does not adhere to and leaves individuals vulnerable 
to abuses, inappropriate conclusions, and unfair actions.  
As proposals for revamping or discarding FIPPs are assessed, the 
transitional state of science should not fall too far into the backdrop. 
Focusing on the process or methods used may be an attempt to 
regulate a moving target, but as a legitimizing force, law will play an 
active role in the development of this shift.    
Perhaps it is best to take the lessons from the first wave of big 
data, minimize the growing pains we can expect from the oncoming 
shift, and guide the development of new practices. In other words, 
without a specific practice to regulate, the focus on the principles is 
essential to guiding the development of responsible big data practices. 
Although there are many aspects of the big data debate that are 
inherent to datafication no matter its size, there are others that seem 
to be associated with the disruptive, particularly substantial influx in 
datafication practices. The same set of lures outlined in Section 
II(b)(2) for modern big data appear to have also spurred the 
probabilistic revolution two hundred years ago. These must be 
managed alongside the inherent concerns that always come with 
datafication in order to avoid some of the traps experienced during the 
first wave of big data. All this must be performed under a set of 
disrupted, disparate, and developing structural changes. A set of 
questions based on the lessons that may be taught by the first wave of 
big data are presented below. Working through each will help situate 
the role of law and policymakers in guiding the development of any 
progressing epistemic emergence.  
 
1. Structural Issues 
 
Structural issues are moving targets during an emergent phase. 
They change and shift as consensus develops and structures solidify. 
The law legitimizes these structural changes through traditional forms 
of regulation in its interaction with these issues. Determining what 
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big-data inquiry should look like, who can undertake it, under what 
terms, and how much deference to give to big data practitioners. 
 
a. Division of Data Labor 
 
The structure of the way in which data was collected and 
processed changed during the avalanche of numbers. Many more 
players from different parts of society were providing and processing 
new forms of data. Unlike France’s centralized statistical practices, 
nineteenth century statistics were performed by scattered parties in 
Great Britain.260 Britain’s administrative bureaucracies had constant 
interaction with the social reformers, scholarly societies, and 
university professors, which led to numerous disputes, reliance, and 
organizational criticism.261 Free-market reform in the country 
emphasized the local powers, adding another layer of disparate data 
collection. The General Register Office (dealing with social statistics) 
and the Board of Trade (dealing with economics) were created to 
coordinate the many moving parts and maintain consistency; the 
Central Statistical Office was created but 1941 to further coordinate 
the fragmented system.262  
These offices intended to serve the public in a time when data did 
not hold the proprietary value it does today. Still, the fragmented data 
labor structure may be served by coordination from a government 
agency that coordinates the many moving parts, resolves 
inconsistencies, and cures inaccuracies amongst the many parties.263 
Questions for today may include whether such a form of governance 
would be an effective way to promote ethical progress and whether 
there is a division of data labor that should not be considered an 
available structure for data practices? There is no data protection 
agency in the United States, and of course, European Union member 
countries established data protection agencies in compliance with the 
1995 Data Protection Directive. However, these agencies are not 
intimately involved with the data practices they govern. The potential 
for such intimacy is low considering hesitation toward government 
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access to personal information and government-corporate 
arrangements to share data. Many U.S. agencies govern data within 
their sector, but an overarching data protection agency may help to 
coordinate ethical and legal practices and baselines across these 
segmented efforts.  
 
b. Methodological 
 
The development of number crunching methods and a significant 
shift in the way questions are answered occurred in the probabilistic 
revolution. The refinement of methodology took place over a number 
of decades, but eventually produced a sophisticated level of scientific 
inquiry that is now required for sound findings. Today big data 
analytics are being practiced across society by the highly trained to the 
budding amateur for different purposes and with various outlets. The 
field of data science and the profession of the data scientist are just 
beginning to take shape. This speaks directly to questions surrounding 
FIPPs as a suitable means of protection moving forward. While the 
second wave of big data methodology is scattered, criticized, and 
difficult to assess, how proactive is the law willing to be to legitimize 
methodology in light of its transitory state and potential?264 This is a 
classic question for innovation, but the distinction between regulating 
particular aspects of data practices and respecting the confidences and 
dignity of users may provide a way forward. 
 
c. The Displacement of Theory 
 
The first wave of big data shed light on the idea that the 
displacement of theory may be a product of transition - a 
characteristic of a changing nature of inquiry, not a characteristic of 
big data practices necessary or an end to theory. This is relevant to the 
way in which we describe the thing we are attempting to govern. There 
is a difference between big data as theory-less and big data theory-
developing. Beyond describing big data more accurately, what is the 
role of law while theory is displaced? A correlation without causation 
form of inquiry may be dangerous when the causation is related to a 
protected class, vulnerable population, or particularly invasive insight. 
How may the law protect impacts of drawing correlations and 
changing notions of choice, free will, and autonomy as these theories 
develop? Legal scholars should continue to voice these concerns about 
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big data. The philosopher-mathematicians that debated these issues in 
the past may not be readily available in the over-specialized modern 
world. Data scientists and legal scholars can coordinate their efforts to 
theorize what big data. 
 
2. Datafication Issues 
 
Datafication issues are inherent issues associated with 
representing facts or ideas in a formalized manner that can be 
communicated or manipulated by a process. These are ever-present 
and must be revisited as the nature of inquiry transform over time. 
The law may legitimize big data practices as they develop by drawing 
lines in between acceptable and unacceptable uses, utilizing big data 
methods and relying on big data-based knowledge, and providing 
means for oversight and participation.   
 
a. Governability 
 
Datafication makes us governable as individuals who must be 
accounted for to receive benefits and vulnerable to the manipulation 
of those counting us. The first wave of big data began from a 
perspective of monarchial rule, which is seemingly less meritorious 
and abusive than data-based governance. The concern was that in 
order to be counted under data-based governance, you had to be 
measured and those that created the measuring stick could exercise 
power over a population. In 1859 John Stuart Mill wrote, “By virtue of 
its superior intelligence gathering and information processing 
capacities, there is a distinct role for the central state acquired in a 
liberal society over and above both local and individual claims to 
autonomy.”265 In order to serve a population, the government has to 
know its population, but should those with superior information 
collection and processing override individual autonomy? The same 
question can be posed to governments, organizations, and companies 
today. Motives matter to the question of governability. What are 
inappropriate motives for those that use big data? What are 
manipulative practices?266  
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b. Data-Based Knowledge  
Numbers are always seen through the lens of knowledge provided 
by a particular time and culture. For instance, psychometrics, the 
study of psychological measurement, developed separately in Britain 
and Germany during the mid-1800s, but both led to intelligence 
testing.267 The correlation between aptitude tests and children led to 
the ‘discovery’ of the ‘g-factor,’ a variable that summarizes positive 
correlation between different cognitive tasks.268 Children were tested 
to determine their general intelligence based on the g-factor at age 
eleven; they were then divided into two very different educational 
tracks. The sociologists of the 1950s attacked the practice as unjust, 
but also that propensity to succeed could be interpreted as effects of 
numerous factors, such as family environment or social 
background.269  How can the law remind itself and the rest of us that 
big data is but one of many ways to understand the world? And that it 
carries its own limitations? Reliance on and legitimization of big data 
practices through incorporation into the legal system will certainly 
reflect limitations. 
 
c. Classification Effects 
 
The way in which classification choices are made can have 
dramatic social impacts and this will continue to be true in the second 
wave of big data. “Perverts” did not exist before the late nineteenth 
century.270 In the 1820s the science of ‘analyse morale,’ the statistics 
of deviance, led to thousands of categories for people and motives 
ranging from labels for mental illness to types of criminals.271 “New 
slots were created in which to fit and enumerate people. Even national 
and provincial censuses amazingly show that the categories into which 
people fall change every ten years. Social change creates new 
categories of people, but the counting is not mere report of 
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developments. It elaborately, often philanthropically, creates new 
ways for people to be.”272 While same sex activity has always been 
present in society, homosexual and heterosexual people were not 
“made up” until the end of the nineteenth century.273 The 
classification effects at data collection and processing stages during 
the first wave of big data have informed the way in which we do 
research today. It revealed that the act of classifying individuals can in 
and of itself be detrimental. Today, and for the last two hundred years 
and before that, classification choices shape identities and 
perceptions.274 How can the law ensure that classifications do not 
unfairly categorize or force individuals into categories that 
inaccurately describe them?275 How should the law protect or 
encourage individual participate in their own classification? How 
should misclassification be resolved?276 In many ways these are 
procedural questions that relate to existing laws like those that protect 
against discrimination. However, policies that promote user 
participation in classification may certainly help resolve some of these 
issues. 
 
3. Big Data Issues 
 
Looking back at the issues that are associated with substantial 
influxes of data can be particularly informative to legal responses to 
the enthusiasm for big data. Realizing that the zeal for big data is 
likely well-founded but also uncertain, the law can look to expected 
disputes, pitfalls, or overlooked harms associated with each lure of big 
data. As a big data participant, the use of big data by the government 
and legal institutions will play an important role in legitimizing and 
directing any oncoming epistemic revolution. The law will also play a 
role in legitimizing practices and perspectives that change the way 
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individuals, groups, and interactions are treated across society during 
this transition.  
a. Standardized Sharing 
 While the benefits of standardized sharing – all of us speaking the 
common language of data – are alluring, it is not as simple or as true 
as it sounds. Datafication is still messy. “Society must be remade 
before it can be the object of quantification.”277 In many ways the 
digital age has remade society to conceive standard representations of 
money, labor, products, and measurements, but there are new aspects 
of the world being datafied that do not yet fall into a standardized 
format. Representing people as data in the digital age is less 
standardized; although the old demographic categories are still relied 
upon, new granularity has presented data without standardized 
measurement or coding. Anyone who has ever received a data set from 
another researcher can tell you that context matters. But, with enough 
data and enough time, standards and categories will develop so the 
data may be employed with “almost... unbounded applicability,”278 
further expanding and limiting data-based knowledge. 
Babbage never got his Constants of Nature and of Art, but his 
proposal realized that the project would be too great for a single 
individual and that scientific societies would need to cooperate. The 
proposal also included Babbage’s nineteen categories for tables to be 
developed. Under the category for “velocities,” he included “arrow, 
musket ball at several distances, cannon ball, sound telegraph, light, 
birds.”279 The problems that arise with numerous individuals spread 
across distances datafying the velocity of birds and arrows shed some 
light on the significant issues related to context and inconsistencies 
that arise from datafying people. How the law can encourage 
contextualized sharing of data that retains as much of the original 
intention and choices made by the collector? Relying on context as a 
conceptualization of privacy has become popular and novel ways to 
retain context or punish its disruption should continue to develop. 
Consequences for not maintaining data quality should also continue to 
be pursued. 
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b. Feedback and Control 
 
The feedback loop allowed for by datafication provides for 
increased control of a system by feeding output data back into the 
controller of the process, but the controller is not the only aspect of 
the loop that adjusts. Those affected by the output of the data adjust to 
the feedback loop as well. There is always a risk of the counter 
creating the population that is it counting.280 This is the issue of 
reflexivity. Although Taylorism sought to motivate workers to be their 
most efficient, many other datafication efforts intend only to give 
people what they want more efficiently. This is not necessarily 
intended to change what it is they want, but this is often the end result 
and very hard to detect or cure. Law professors can easily relate to the 
concept of reflexivity, as they are situated in institutions that 
exemplify (and often resist) the practice of adapting to the rankings 
that “make them count.”281 Those counted adjust to be accounted for 
and those left uncounted become invisible, forfeiting the benefits that 
being counted provide.282  
It is said that Taylorism failed because it modelled the worker as 
simply self-interested, through the model of systematic soldering, and 
the managers as “heartily cooperative.”283 The asymmetry left no room 
for intelligence and innovation of employees. Education tracking has 
also been similarly criticized as limiting the potential of those students 
assessed in lower tracks and providing curriculum that reinforces 
inequalities.284 Today algorithmic living has become the norm. From 
the filter bubble to modern scientific management of work, algorithms 
direct us. At what point does the further integration of human-
machine systems reach a dehumanizing point at which law should 
address the issue? What kind of transparency in these systems should 
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be required or encouraged? This is an area that needs significant 
contribution from modern legal scholars. Questions surrounding 
important distinctions between humans and machines should be 
engaged promptly. 
 
c. Objectivity 
 
Reliance on the impersonality of numbers provides a convincing 
way to make decisions while avoiding claims of coercion, improper 
bias, or stirring up the public.285 Objectivity was an important driving 
force for scientific developments over the course of the nineteenth 
century, advocated strongly for by prominent figures like Pearson who 
saw… “Science claims unblemished character, not for the individuals 
who make it, but for the knowledge that results… The rhetoric of 
science is persuasive in large part because that knowledge is assumed 
not to depend on the fallible individuals who constitute the scientific 
community.”286  
Today it is well understood that the rules that govern scientific 
knowledge and the choices made within it are subject to human 
fallibility, but it hard to remember. In nineteenth century France, 
where public suspicion and interest was aroused by administrative 
decisions made on their own authority, numbers and statistics were 
indispensable as the credible language of disinterested French 
engineers that were also generally incomprehensible to the public at 
large.287 Objectivity continues to permeate our efforts to solve social 
problems288 in a setting where government decisions are scrutinized 
and data practices are beyond the reach of much of the public. How 
should the law reinforce the “human” aspects of big data? How can 
and should values in design be assessed and directed for developing 
big data practices? Avoiding overreliance by legal entities on the 
objectivity of these systems is one way. Another is further 
development of privacy by design concepts. 
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d. Knowledge Discovery 
 
When knowledge about people is discovered and not produced, it 
certainly carries an air of objectivity. Knowledge ‘discovery’ also 
appears to bring enthusiasm for identifying the ‘rules’ or sequences 
that make the world go round; in other words, a growing interest in 
determinism and waves of big data seem to go hand in hand. In 1836 
Quetelet wrote, “The moral order falls in the domain of statistics… a 
discouraging fact for those who believe in the perfectibility of human 
nature. It seems as if free will exists only in theory.”289 When 
knowledge is discovered, like the law of gravity, entire systems can 
and must be built around such laws. It is only slightly comforting to 
know that statistical laws may apply to populations but not members 
of a population, but are consistently feel discomfort when presented 
with a defendant and crime statistics that bring concerns about 
responsibility and likelihood of guilt, such as the statistic that those 
physically abused are nine times more likely to be involved in criminal 
activity and a third will abuse their own children.290  
Social physics is back, thanks to the second wave of big data.291 
Understanding the laws of social physics allows human life to be re-
engineered for desired effect, or so the echoed argument goes.292 
Whether the big data transition will be a return to determinism, or 
knowledge “discovery” will be qualified or go through the painful 
phase that social laws and probability went through, will be a matter 
of guiding big data methodology and understanding through its 
development. Like every strategy to gain knowledge, it has its 
drawbacks, but even in its infancy, its strong appeal has accelerated 
big data-based knowledge discovery forwarded. What is the role of law 
when faced with determinism? Certainly, it legitimizes certain 
practices through its own use of analytics and evidence-based policy – 
avoiding “pre-crime” programs293 – but how should the law impart 
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any misgivings about determinism onto other big data users? Not only 
will the law be tempted to acknowledge determinism, it will also be 
asked to consider probability and prediction in new light as big data 
changes the way we understand the world.  
 
e. Enumeration 
 
Objectivity, feedback and control, and knowledge discovery, 
encourage enumeration, but enumeration has not gone well. Tempted 
by the idea that so much more can be datafied, scientists during waves 
of big data seek to datafy everyone and everything. Attempts to 
capture all data assume that all data is captured; this error often has 
to be resolved retroactively. Early attempts to universally datafy had 
to be tempered and results qualified, such as in Great Britain and 
Germany. Efforts to enumerate consistently fail to recognize those 
individuals and characteristics of people and the surrounding world 
that are invisible to the processes of datafication at our disposal.294 
How can the law encourage the acknowledgement of those not 
counted, by choice or situation, those people and aspects of the world 
that remain invisible?295 Acknowledging and protecting those without 
a voice is often the law’s job. Looking to the ways in which it has done 
so in other settings would support progress in the big data transition.  
These questions do not present an exhaustive list of questions for 
big data today,296 but those that may have longer historical references 
to guide us. The questions require no balance of the benefits and 
harms of big data. Where is the line between control and 
manipulation? No benefit should resolve that question. How can those 
that use big data-based knowledge recognize and express its bias, 
reductions, and limitations? How should errors in any of the questions 
be communicated and resolved? There are plenty of questions to 
answer that do not hinge on weighing pros and cons of big data, which 
has proven to be an exceptionally problematic exercise at the point in 
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the transition.297 Value disputes that do not rely on the outcome of this 
potential emergence, however, can be chipped away at and refined. 
This process has already begun with work by Ryan Calo on 
manipulation, Deirdre Mulligan and Cynthia Dwork on classification, 
Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz on feedback and control, and many 
others cited above. Often these normative works argue for prescriptive 
adjustments to big data practices – acting as legitimizer of certain 
directions for big data. This article has attempted to place those 
normative analyses and prescriptions in a broader perspective and 
enrich their contributions. The challenge is utilizing these 
contributions through an uncertain trajectory, recognizing the 
important role law plays in its direction. 
CONCLUSION 
The truth of the matter is that our deficiency does not 
lie in the well-verified ‘facts.’ What we lack is our 
bearings. The contemporary experience of things 
technological has repeatedly confounded our vision, 
our expectations, and our capacity to make intelligent 
judgments.298    
Often the pressure to look forward prevents us from looking back 
to get “our bearings.” This article attempts to present data in a 
historical perspective to help establish those bearings in the exciting 
and tumultuous Digital Age. Many have pointed out the social 
problems presented by big data practices. Others have pointed out 
that existing data protection policies no longer work in a big data 
world. Most have acknowledged that big data is something different, 
whether in degree or kind, and that it offers great potential for a 
certain type of knowledge and innovation. 
Relying on the avalanche of numbers as an appropriate 
comparison for big data (because of their similarities as titles for 
waves of data that flooded society following a technological revolution 
and the set of similarities extracted from the two periods) allows the 
big data phenomenon to be better understood historically and 
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categorically. By comparing big data to the avalanche of numbers, an 
analysis of similarities reveals aspects of datafication that are ever-
present, others that are lures associated with the excitement and 
optimism during both waves of big data, and structural changes to the 
nature of inquiry for the period.  The avalanche of numbers was an 
important period in the early stages of an epistemic shift: the 
widespread recognition and understanding of probability and chance. 
Based on the similarities shared between big data and the avalanche 
of numbers and associated emergence of probability, the article 
situates big data in the early stages of a similarly prolonged, culturally 
entrenched, and still uncertain epistemic emergence.  
Looking to the past for a richer understanding of the issues, I do 
not find that this is all a palaver over nothing – that big data is 
nothing new or that it is a lot of hype about nothing. Instead I find 
that there is potential for a significant epistemic shift on the horizon – 
one that presents the law with a great deal of uncertainty and 
responsibility. The role of law during times of optimism, disruption, 
and uncertainty is challenging, but there are lessons to be learned to 
from the avalanche of numbers that may mitigate the pains of 
progress presented by big data.  
 
 
* * * 
 
 

